Parents and relatives hold portraits of the Chibok schoolgirls who are still missing after they were kidnapped by Boko Haram militants on April 14, 2014. (Audu Ali Marte, AFP/ File picture)

Case Data

Failed African states and politically unstable states share similarities in that they are unable to maintain control over violence. A state in this case study is a political institution with complete control over violence within its territory. [1] To fully rule a region, requires the authority to use violence legitimately to control it if necessary.[1] States that have failed to uphold their monopoly on violence, due to internal issues, such as inadequate resources, corrupt practices and overstretched troops often find themselves susceptible to attacks by extremist, terror groups. “A rise in attacks had led to a concurrent rise in deaths, African Jihadi groups were responsible for an estimated 13 059 deaths in 2020 alone. These occurred primarily across the five major theatres of instability: Lake Chad, the Sahel, Egypt, Somalia, and Mozambique. Twenty-two African countries- nearly half of the continent- now face violence from Jihadi groups.”[2] In African failed states, the absence or breakdown of the monopoly on violence is a significant factor contributing to their failure, according to Weber's concept. Rebel groups, militias, and warlords often challenge the state's authority and engage in violence with impunity, undermining its ability to maintain law and order, protect citizens, and provide essential services. On the 14th of April 2014, Boko Haram went on a supply run in Chibok, a small, isolated town in Borno.[3]During this mission, the insurgents stumbled upon the schoolgirls. Seizing the opportunity, the insurgents loaded the schoolgirls onto trucks and swiftly departed under the cover of nightfall, marking one of the most substantial mass abductions in Nigerian history.[4] Kidnapping for ransom is a well-established tactic for Boko Haram and a lucrative enterprise within the broader Nigerian context.In the wake of the mass abduction, it became evident that the Nigerian government and military were unable to react efficiently and effectively, to rescue the children, instead, civil society and the local populace banded together to form BBOG (BringBackOurGirls). BBOG was not simply a social media campaign, but a Nigerian grass-roots, women-led movement that saw protests across several major cities, and the forming of civilian militia groups in Borno, who went to known Boko Haram territories to rescue the girls. BBOG made use of technology and social media to bring awareness to their organisation, the plight of the Chibok girls and the failure of the Nigerian government. Increased physical and online engagements saw the release of several girls, the restructuring of the Nigerian government and ultimately the election of a new president.[5]

Problems and Purpose

 The elevated incidence of criminality within Nigeria can be primarily attributed to the persistent nature of issues, such as poverty, unemployment, inadequate governance and the absence of effective policing and execution.[6] Additionally, key socio-economic factors, such as the distribution of urban and rural populations, and service delivery have been recognized as inhibitors of this. Regardless, it remains the sole duty of the state to prioritize the safeguarding of its populace by orchestrating the collaborative efforts of its agencies to proactively prevent and combat all iterations of criminality within all societal spheres. [7] The shortcomings of governments in delivering security and essential social services have provided the fertile ground for the emergence of jihadist organizations within Nigeria, often operating with impunity. “The indigenous population lacks the confidence in the organs, in fact, often perceiving them as a source of threat”.[8] Nigeria despite its population size and economic strength, has faced significant challenges in maintaining security and combating terrorism. Nigeria has experienced prolonged periods of political instability, violence, and the presence of radical terrorist groups and banditry that plague the northeast, northwest and southeast of Nigeria.[9]

The struggle to address this security threat in Nigeria can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, the insurgency tactics employed by groups like Boko Haram have proven difficult to counter effectively. Additionally, these groups have successfully recruited local individuals and exploited ethnic and socio-economic grievances, further complicating the security situation.[10] Furthermore, Nigeria's governance structures and institutional capacity have proven to be less than robust, exacerbating the challenges faced by the Nigerian Defence Force (NDF). The NDF, already plagued by issues such as low morale, lack of training, and human rights abuses, has struggled to respond effectively to security threats. Limited intelligence capabilities and coordination among security agencies have further hampered the NDF's efforts.[10]

As a result of the mass kidnapping of schoolchildren, the Nigerian Federal Government and the State Government, as well as critical security stakeholders attempted to implement several measures to protect schoolchildren through the Safe School Initiative, rescue operations, back-door negotiations, peace deals, amnesty and the closure of schools. These security measures recorded varying levels of success, and challenges within themselves.[11] These measures were seen by the public as superficial and non-urgent; the lack of action was what prompted the birth of BBOG, and the initial march to Abuja, the Nigerian capital. The #BBOG movement was a demonstration of a collective frustration with the Nigerian government and the state of insecurity. All protest action by local Nigerian activists was met with levels of resistance and intimidation by Nigerian state operatives, to keep the issue of the Chibok girls out of the limelight. Within this context, #BBOG was seen initially as a Nigerian, women-led movement that started as physical protests by Nigerian citizens, concerned parents and families across Nigerian cities, which ultimately evolved into a social media campaign with many sharing their stories across posts through Facebook, Twitter, blogs and Youtube videos that generated millions of views demanding the Nigerian government to act swiftly and rescue the schoolgirls and bring justice to victims across the country, as well as several protests abroad by the Ugandan diaspora. [12] Innovative collaboration among activists, the local populace and the girl's families against the poignant imagery of innocent schoolgirls kidnapped and abused by terrorists attracted national and international attention. BBOG resulted in weeks of heated protests in Abuja, the protests in Abuja were ultimately banned by Nigerian officials, with Abuja Police Commissioner, Joseph Mbu stating that the protests pose a security threat to citizens in the capital city, “ Information reaching us is that soon dangerous elements will join groups under the guise of protest and detonate explosives aimed at embarrassing the government. Accordingly, protests against the Chibok Girls are hereby banned with immediate effect”. [13]

Participatory democracy can be said to be the original form ‘of democracy which originated in small towns and city-states as a form of small-scale self-government that was based on a mono-cultural community, which was uniform and had minor differences”.[14] Barber states that participatory democracy is associated with deliberative democracy, where citizens deliberate and interact with one another in search of common ground and public good.[14] BBOG saw the Nigerian population use their collective voice to engage the Nigerian government over the issue of school kidnappings, as well as the protection and safety of children. The campaign exemplifies the democratisation of information and activism through the use of social media, which enabled individuals and families to voice their concerns and hold the government accountable. Especially when one considers how the Nigerian government attempted to keep the issue silent and ban protest action. 

This ban only served to further politicize the issue and the Nigerian Government’s lagging response, with reports in May of 2014, by the head of the Nigerian military stating that the girls had been located but could not be freed by force, “We can’t go and kill our girls in the name of trying to get them back”. [14] The situation further intensified, after a video surfaced, showing Boko Haram rebel commander, Abubakar Shekau stating: “I abducted your girls… I will send them in the market, by Allah”.[15] This came in the wake of weeks of no publicized efforts by then President Johnathan Goodluck, who had deceived the families of the girls, as well as the international community that most of the girls had been rescued, despite evidence to the contrary. [16] Despite initial attempts to play down the kidnapping, President Goodluck eventually relented and allowed international aid to come in and assist with the search for the girls. With the Nigerian election looming, the growing impunity of Boko Haram and rising socio-economics, the polarizing issue of the Chibok girls served as a significant obstacle in the Nigerian political sphere. President Goodluck attempted to galvanise support for his re-election by appropriating the #BBOG with #bringbackgoodluck2015, which almost immediately backfired and turned a strong percentage of the populace against him for being disrespectful and opportunistic, whilst failing to rescue the schoolgirls after several months of captivity.[5] The politicization of the Chibok schoolgirls and failures to take mass kidnappings seriously is one of the primary reasons, Nigerian commentators believe that President Goodluck lost the 2015 Nigerian presidential elections to Muhammadu Buhari. [5] President Buhari was elected under the premise and the belief that he would work with civil society, campaigners, security actors and international advisors to bring back the girls, whilst finding a long-term solution to combatting Boko Haram. [5]

Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities

Oby Ezekwesili is one of the three founding Nigerian activists who started the grassroots campaign, #BBOG. Obey Ezekwesili was formerly the Minister of Education and could not believe the lack of action by the government. Kidnapping for ransom and attacks on children is not uncommon by terror groups and bandits in Nigeria. Previously in February of 2014, fifty-nine boys were killed in a federal government secondary school in Buni Yadi, a village in the northeast of Nigeria. Due to the persistent nature of attacks by terror groups and high levels of violence, attacks on the civilian populace often go unreported and do not often get international coverage.[18] At a protest in Abuja, Oby urged the government to intervene and bring back the girls. This catalyzed the greater movement, with Nigerian civil servants lamenting that the movement was not coordinated but organic.[19] Religious scholars of varying faiths have called out the terror group for their actions and manipulation of religious texts to suit their illegal agenda. [20] Additionally, Muslim religious leaders have criticized Boko Haram rebel leader, Abubakar Shekaku, for using Islamic scripture to justify his threat of selling the girls into slavery, with many stating that this kidnapping is un-Islamic and contradicts the Koran.

A variety of organizations threw their weight being BBOG, with the likes of: Women Arise against Terror, African National Congress of Women’s League South Africa, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), UNICEF, United Nations, Amnesty International and Nigeria’s National Orientation Agency to name a few.[16] Despite the support of international activists, foreign governments and international organizations, BBOG has largely rejected funding from these groups, instead relying on donations from members and in-kind support. This was done deliberately by the leadership of BBOG, to prevent any in-fighting within the organization, as well as to prevent BBOG from shifting priorities from pressuring the government to sharing money, whilst almost maintaining their neutral, bi-partisan status.[17] Notable supporters of BBOG, include then First Lady of the United States, Michelle Obama, former United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Nobel Peace Prize and female education activist, Malala Yousafzai to mention a few, posted on their verified social media handles or made public remarks about it.

The Nigerian Government initially attempted to keep the issue under wraps, classifying the protests as an issue of national security and banning the protests, whilst also rejecting international offers for assistance.[21] Several protests demanding the rescue of the girls held in May of 2014 were dispersed by Nigerian security forces, with authorities fearing that the protests in politically volatile regions of Nigeria would spark sectarian violence. Kaduna, a Nigerian city, known for sectarian violence, was locked down completely with a 24-hour curfew imposed, however, it did not go unnoticed by observers that the level of weaponry and troops used to lock down Kaduna, would have been better utilised in searching for the schoolgirls, which further reiterates the government’s priorities in rescuing the girls and the need of the civilian populace to lead rescue efforts.[21] The government of BBOG protests and rallies saw the social media movement grow and placed greater pressure and scrutiny on the Nigerian government, the security situation across Nigeria, as well as a questioning of the agenda of President Johnathan Goodluck. 

Participant Recruitment and Selection

The #BBOG protests in 2014, and the subsequent protests over the years saw organic recruitment in both physical and virtual spaces, with the imagery of the kidnapped girls naturally grabbing the heartstrings of those who interacted with posts. Local activists and the families of the girls shared their messaging in heartful blogs, tweets and videos, which in turn were amplified by local and international influencers, using their platforms.[16] BBOG was set to be a once-off protest on April 30 2014, however, due to the poignant imagery of the girls and the passion and despair of the families, BBOG exploded as a movement. At the Abuja protest, a family member of one of the Chibok girls knelt and begged the crowd: “Don’t leave us; if you do, they (the Nigerian government) will forget us”.[17] Since the initial protest in April of 2014, there have been more than 200 protests staged within and outside of Nigeria.[17] Twitter and Facebook served as two primary platforms where attention and agency were created with the likes of Michelle Obama, Alicia Keys and a host of celebrities banded together to raise awareness of the issue, with many standing in solidarity and commenting on the activities and the status of rescue efforts.

Furthermore, the reportage, posts and videos shared by domestic and international media (traditional, virtual and digital) served as an alternative means to recruit further members and followers of BBOG. The combination of media and social media platforms was highly effective, as #BBOG’s virality reached millions, which prompted further physical protests by Nigerian citizens, the Ugandan diaspora and international communities. #BBOg served as a means for Nigerian activists to hold the government accountable, provide justice and therapy to the victim's families and invigorate the youth to fight for a safer Nigeria. 

The global response to #BBOG spurred governments and international organisations into action while highlighting the potential of citizen-led movements to drive change, as well as emphasizing the importance of a responsive and accountable government. Therein lies the similarities as stated by Barber, about the importance of a strong civil society who is actively participating in the political landscape. 

Methods and Tools Used

Digital communication platforms served as a means for Nigerian activists, families and civil society to collaborate and coordinate protests across Nigeria. [20] With the continued threat of Boko Haram repeating a similar attack, mass mobilization occurred organically and efficiently on the streets. This is despite the Nigerian government banning the protest actions and activists being harassed and intimidated by state operatives. Additionally, online technology provided the platform for the mass mobilisation of concerned humans through posts on social media (Facebook-live, Twitter posts, and TikTok videos) which generated millions of views and shares. 

Some of the Chibok schoolgirls who escaped their Boko Haram Islamist captors wait to meet the Nigerian president at the presidency in Abuja on July 22, 2014.

(Wole Emmanuel | AFP | Getty Images)

What Went On: Process, Interaction, and Participation

The lack of urgency and action by the Nigerian military and government in the wake of the kidnapping of the Chibok girls served as a mobilizing call for citizens and the families of the schoolgirls to band together to bring awareness to the plight of the schoolgirls. Intelligence reports revealed that the Nigerian military was made aware four hours before the attack, that a convoy of Boko Haram was en route to Chibok. Amnesty International, were unable to uncover that despite the intelligence alert, they chose not to send reinforcements to Chibok, a result of a lack of resources and unwillingness to engage with the well-armed terrorists.[22] “The fact that Nigerian security forces knew about Boko haram’s impending raid but failed to take immediate action needed to stop it, will only amplify the national and international outcry at this horrific crime. It amounts to gross dereliction of Nigeria’s duty to protect civilians, who remain sitting ducks for such attacks, the Nigerian leadership must use all lawful means at their disposal to secure the girls’ safe release and ensure nothing like this can happen again” said Netsanet Belay, Amnesty International’s Africa Director.[22]

The responsibility to protect had emerged from debates surrounding humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, with cases of human rights violations, genocide and mass atrocities on the rise. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a global norm, which was established by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. The core premise was simple, it turned the notion of the ‘right to intervene’ upside and instead of the focus of big states having to fulfil the role of protector, the onus of responsibility was instead placed on all states to protect their citizens from heinous atrocities. [23] R2P is generally associated with state intervention in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, however, R2P can certainly be extended to non-state actors, in this instance, Boko Haram, who posed a threat to the civilian populace of Nigeria. The protection of the most vulnerable is not restricted by borders, instead, US President Carter in 1977 made the case that; “where basic human rights are concerned, all governments are countable not only to their citizens but to the entire community of nations”.[23] This responsibility to protect and the government's inaction resulted in the creation of the ‘Civilian JTF’, named after the military’s special operation, the Joint Task Force. The Civilian JTF was made up of local youths who started policing areas where Boko Haram was known to operate, according to several sources, the civilian JTF had helped security forces foil two attacks in Borno State. [26] Residents in Borno stated, “ The only place where there is safety, is where the civilian JTF are operating. That means we depend on ourselves”.[26]

A key tenet of democratic participation is the ability of the citizens to hold their government accountable if they are dissatisfied. In terms of the #BringBackOurGirls movement, Nigerian citizens and activists used their collective voices and human power to demand government action, whilst simultaneously calling for transparency and accountability from the government, in terms of their response to the mass abduction.[24] BBOG organically evolved into a form of civic engagement, where the Nigerian populace used their collective might to leverage their democratic rights to influence government action, which ultimately in the election of a new president, Muhammadu Buhari.

Despite the creation of BBOG in 2014, the movement continues to live on nine years after the initial kidnapping, approximately 100 of the girls continue to live on in captivity. Despite decreased virality in recent times, the movement continues to operate and gain attention, as kidnapping remains rife in Nigeria and the spread of terrorist organizations continues to spiral across the African continent. 

Influence, Outcomes, and Effects

The mass abduction of the Chibok girls under the watch of President Johnathan Goodluck, and the failures of the Nigerian Defence Forces resulted in President Goodluck meeting with controversial military advisor, Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater. Prince connected Goodluck with Eeben Barlow, founder of Executive Outcomes and now running and operating Specialized Tasks, Training and Protection (STTEP).[25] STTEP was initially employed to rescue the Chibok girls, but this mission set evolved into combatting Boko Haram, as the insurgent group continued their rampage across the country. STTEP’s mission was to train up a Nigerian force to assist in the rescue operation, as such a 5-week selection process was implemented, to empower the NDF. This new formerly Nigerian, under the leadership, was called the 72nd Mobile Strike Force, the formation of this unit played a pivotal role in spearheading an operation to would cripple Boko Haram. Barlow speaking on the operation stated, “ The operation was in three phases, the first phase was to cut a dividing line across north-eastern Nigeria and isolate Boko Haram into two isolated areas and mop up. One area in the south was the start and after that then mop up in the north. The division would then follow behind and occupy the terrain. But we were never allowed to execute the entire operation. In one month, we took back terrain larger than the terrain of Belgium, which was occupied by Boko Haram. We were not allowed to finish because it came at a time when governments were in the process of changing. President Jonathan’s government saw the Boko Haram contract as a last gasp to gain election popularity. The incoming president, Buhari was heavily supported by the US and one of the first missions was to terminate our contract”.[25]

The failure to combat Boko Haram and the pressure from the Nigerian populace ultimately resulted in the election of Muhammadu Buhari as president in 2015. Boko Haram and increased banditry continue to plague Nigeria, over the years, several girls have been rescued, however, 100 girls remain in captivity. Kidnapping in Nigeria has boomed as a viable business, as such the outcome and success of BBOG is hard to articulate or measure. 

Pictures of some of the missing Chibok girls who are still missing as of 2023

(Olukayode Jaiyeola/Nurphoto via Getty Images)

Analysis and Lessons Learned

Security operations are complex and unpredictable, particularly when it comes to the business of terror organizations. From a humanistic, moral perspective BBOG served a purpose; it united the local populace, gave the victim's families a means to cope and hold the Nigerian government accountable and assisted in bringing in foreign aid and resources. In terms of a security perspective, the virality of BBOG was detrimental. The domestic and international attention that BBOG received, only served to increase the value of the girls for Boko Haram, it pushed the insurgents to go deeper into hiding with the kidnapped girls. Furthermore, BBOG placed the Nigerian government in a precarious position, with all the international attention, the Nigerian government could not be seen negotiating with terrorists, and as such the ability to back door negotiations fell away. In terms of hostage rescue, governments cannot be seen negotiating with terrorists, as it establishes a precedent and a viable means of profit for terror organizations. Kidnapping in Nigeria has bloomed into a million-dollar industry, as such the success of BBOG is largely superficial. Eebeen Barlow a vastly experienced soldier was publicly quoted as stating; “ This type of nonsense does not save girls”.[25] Objectively, Barlow is correct, however, BBOG did serve a purpose in that it created a climate where attention was brought to the atrocities of Boko Haram and partially revitalized the Nigerian Defence Force, whilst fortifying the resilience, self-empowerment of civilian security groups to step into that void of fighting Boko Haram alongside the Nigerian Defence Force.  To this day, there are still approximately 100 schoolgirls still in captivity and kidnapping remains part of Boko Haram's modus operandi, with each Nigerian president since attempting to implement and navigate their own counter-terrorism strategy with limited resources.

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External Links

1. Audu Ali Marte, AFP/ File picture
2. Wole Emmanuel | AFP | Getty Images
3. Olukayode Jaiyeola/Nurphoto via Getty Images