Report on the experience of participatory Budgeting in Santa Catarina from 2024 to the year 2026.

Participatory Budgeting is a democratic innovation which seeks to involve the public in debating processes relating to expenditure on goods and services by the government for local communities. Since its origins in Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil, it has diffusing to many societies, being observed in different instances across the globe. This case focuses on the modern iterations of Participatory Budgeting in the state of Santa Catarina (SC), Brazil. The State level procedure is being conducted by the state deputy Pedro Uczai, drawing on previous iterations since 2024 which he also oversaw. The ongoing nature of the newest iteration of the project means that the recording of results cannot be undertaken as of the writing of this case study. Nevertheless, this cycle is important in acknowledging the experience of modern PB in the state. This report details the experience of this democratic innovation in the State of Santa Catarina following its first legislative implementation and reintroduction in 2018, under law number 10.461/18 (According to the Budgetary Guidelines Act set in 2018), to its current state in 2026.

To contextualise, the use of participatory budgeting, in many instances, is used to tackle the issues of uneven resource distribution as well as the centralisation of power. It achieves this through directly involving citizens in decision-making processes that otherwise would have been left up to the government and thus can be understood as a practical application of participatory democratic theory [1][2]. Despite having a Gini coefficient higher than the national average – representing its low rates of poverty – inequality yet remains an issue [3]. The use of PB in this situation is used not only to devolve some government power to the wider public but also to provide aid to disadvantaged areas in the state. Furthermore, the state has the third highest HDI score in Brazil. Santa Catarina utilises a hybrid system, combining legislative and participatory aspects: reflected in the engraining of projects resultant of pb into municipal law where they become parliamentary amendments. This legalisation cements the outcomes of public participation within institutions, providing a more robust framework for the implementations of participatory budgeting. This state level democratic innovation is also seen on the municipal level. It must be understood that this does not replace local initiatives, rather adding onto them.

Institutional Design and Territorial structure:

The State of Santa Catarina is divided (as per the website under Professor Uczai’s name) into 12 distinct territories [4]. This of course has implications for how the budget is divided, with 13 deliberated proposals from each territory receiving R$250,000 (per proposal) amounting to R$3.25 million per territory and R$39 million in total budget across the state of Santa Catarina in 2026 [4]. Furthermore, proposals must address one of 15 thematic areas, including Health; Infrastructure; social assistance and family; education; sport; fishing; tourism; culture; women; environment; energy transition; science and technology; justice and citizenship; agriculture/ agronomy; and human rights, racial equality and indigenous people [4].

Procedure:

For each cycle, Deputy Uczai [4] has outlined a multi-stage process on how the project is to be conducted for the newest iteration. The 2026 cycle sees a total of four stages. The first stage (which has recently concluded as of the writing of this report) is named as the mobilisation stage, where participants register to take part in the initiative. This is done primarily online, through the registration portal linked to the Pedro Uczai website [4]. Secondly, territorial assemblies are to be conducted, where proposals are detailed by their authors and subsequently voted upon. Public communication for the process is conducted primarily through the official Pedro Uczai website, social media channels, online registration pages, and announcements linked to territorial assemblies. Whilst inscription is done through online portals, assemblies are conducted face to face. Voting rules are decided by the board of coordination and are revised before each assembly. This is to commence on the 16th of April of 2026, after the closing of registrations. In these assemblies, 13 projects across all municipalities in the territory will be chosen. Pf. Uczai has detailed that a minimum of 7 must address the health sector with 3 for hospitals and 4 for any other health initiative. The rest may address any of the thematic areas [4]. This process has remained largely the same and documented in a similar fashion from 2024 to the present year.

The voting process typically consists of a One Person One Vote system, which is preceded by local and regional discussions. This is where proposals are gathered and deliberated by the representatives and ranked [4]. Therein, highest ranked (or prioritised) proposals are advanced to regional discussions, in which the public votes on them. Anyone over the age of 16 is able to vote for and submit proposals – so long as they meet the minimum number of required signatures. Subsequently, upon collecting the votes, the superior council is expected to approve projects, for 2026, this is to occur in the month of July. The superior council this year is composed of 13 individuals from each territory, 7 starters and 6 substitutes, from the pool of successful candidates – those who have submitted proposals – whereas the 2025 cycle saw a maximum of 5 representatives per territory. It is then that they will deliberate on issues pertaining to the proposals, and then subsequently forward them to the next stage [4]. Ultimately, the finalised results will be posted through the state deputy’s channels and successful proposals are to be implemented as parliamentary amendments (as also seen in other instances of Participatory Budgeting schemes), wherein the remainder of the process is monitored by the mandate team– comprised of 22 members in Uczai’s circle – as well as the municipal governments.

The previous cycles have the addition of a fifth stage, dividing the second stage into 2 parts: the prioritisation stage (in which the assembly vote on which proposals are most significant), followed by the public consultation phase – which was conducted through ‘virtual means’. Though the fourth stage goes by a different name, the function is congruent to that of the newest version. It is also significant to note that there will be no state level voting stage this year, neither online nor in person. Rather, voting will take place on the territorial level and winning proposals will be considered exclusively. In previous years, this stage would have observed proposals from each territory being voted upon by delegates from each region. Previous cycles also saw the division of budget into the same regions among 13 thematic areas; with a prioritisation on the health sector, however, without a minimum number of proposals being required for the individual sector. Rather, a spending cap was implemented. For example, the budget for health in 2025 totaled R$10 million per territory, though for other areas it totaled R$2 million. Another stark difference is to be found in the total allocation of investments – now the total budget has exceeded R$2 million more than the previous year. Each of the 12 territories in the 2025 cycle was promised around R$2 million [5], with the lowest payout being R$1.6 million in the territory of Itajai. Furthermore, in the 2025 cycle, the number of projects awarded was less than the present year, with only 10 per territory [5]. As described the total budget for the current year is R$39 million, allowing for more money to be awarded to each territory.

Actors:

It has been noted [4] that anyone over the age of 16 is able to submit a proposal. Delegates are selected based on the number of signatures, garnering the minimum of 100 signatures from their area in order for it to be brought to the assemblies. The assemblies utilise a one person one vote model to come to a decision. Those actors are the registered citizens who choose to vote. Meanwhile, the superior council are tasked with validating results affirming that they adhere to the ethical and legal standards set by the state. Moving to the implementation stage, state deputy Uczai’s team oversees the process and formalises winning proposals as parliamentary amendments [4], which are subsequently implemented by municipal governments. Validation is procedural and not subject to alteration by local governments therefore, giving the final say to the state level actors as documents are required to be legalised municipally. Subsequently, the representatives are tasked with monitoring and evaluate the execution of proposals – yet little information is publicly available.

Monitoring and Outcomes:

Once projects are approved, their progress is tracked using official transparency websites at both state and municipal levels. These sites provide access to details about budgets and spending. The deputy’s team in 2026 monitors the progress of projects, working with local governments responsible for carrying them out as opposed to the involvement of the superior council in this phase. As projects are handed over to local authorities, all documentation and reporting happen at the municipal level. This means information like final expenditure ends up spread across several different platforms, a limitation of this case. The results of the 2024 participatory budget have been recorded on a centralised website, which displays the names of the winning projects, the amounts awarded [6]. This does not include information regarding completion timelines, as is the case for the finalised 2025 proposals, of which results can also be found on a similar portal [5]. Though, the years of 2024-2025 did see an attempt at centralising results – this is expected for the 2026 cycle, yet it is unknown if there will be any improvements to data collection methods. The overall 2025 ‘winner’ was reported to be the Hospital Veterinário Maria Schmitt (Araranguá), receiving over 19,000 of the 170,000 total votes. The project aimed to enhance the hospital’s capacity to provide veterinary care. This is to be accomplished through improved diagnostic infrastructure, enabling more efficient identification and treatment of animal health issues. In doing so, it seeks to expand access to public veterinary services, particularly for underserved communities. This also strengthens the institution’s role as a regional service provider. However, measurable results pertaining to the success of the project are again inefficiently dispersed across multiple municipal transparency sites (for example) [7].

Ultimately, the Participatory Budgeting process in the state of Santa Catarina has seen both methodological and structural differences over the three most recent iterations. It is an ever-evolving process, which builds upon the limitations of the previous versions to better reflect the aims of the project which are to primarily provide aid to disadvantaged areas as well as involve the public in the decision-making process. It is these methodological changes which reflect the lessons learned from previous years, particularly regarding the efficiency of the process.

Participatory Budgeting in Santa Catarina: how well does it satisfy the democratic goods of Smith?

Participatory budgeting on the state level in Santa Catarinais a relatively new implementation. Melo et al [8] analyse the successes of the endeavor upon the practice’s legislatorial ingraining with focus on the municipality of Florianopolis, noting that this gave greater legitimacy to the practice. As is seen with the state-level version, proposals are also made into parliamentary amendments – reinforcing legitimacy. This section seeks to evaluate the use of participatory budgeting across the state, how it affected each territory, to arrive at the judgement of whether it has been able to fulfil its democratic promises. All the while, this will be analysed using the democratic goods suggested by Graham smith [9] – Inclusion; considered judgement; popular control; transparency; efficiency; and finally, transferability. The 2026 cycle will be most considered in this discussion as it serves as a culmination of its predecessors. With this, it is to be debated how well these qualities are met by this instance of the democratic innovation. As is with most cases, some aspects may be favoured over others. Furthermore, it is important to note that PB was legally integrated at the municipal level in the year of 2018. This served to reinforce its usage by making it harder to supplant, as was seen in Porto Alegre when political shifts led to the erosion of the practice [10].

Does the innovation satisfy the conditions of inclusion? Inclusion not only refers to mere access but also the extent to which participation reflects the broader population, what efforts are being made to avoid the exclusion of minorities. Melo [8] makes the case that the Brazilian state has given freedom for each of its citizens to exercise their rights as an individual – the consequence of an amendment to the pre-1988 definition of ‘citizenry’ being merely the “right of nationality”, now more adequately reflecting the people’s “rights to the city” in which they live [11] as well as their rights to participate and integrate within their community. As the definition of the citizenry became more personal and tailored to a local level, this deliberative process was also not limited to certain individuals – addressing one of the criteria of Smith’s [9] “inclusivity”. Pedro Uczai’s 2025 scheme observed a total of 170,000 votes, clear evidence that inclusion is being met in terms of the sheer number of potential actors. Another dimension to inclusivity is in how well the sampling method reflects the citizenry. The representatives for each municipality are decided through self-selection [4] – problematic in terms of biases and accessibility as those with more political clout or knowledge are more privileged. Each participant requires a minimum of 100 signatures in order to be chosen [4]. In total, of the 12 territories included, they elect 13 members (7 starters and 6 substitutes) who have each made a proposition. In terms of inclusivity, one might argue that the large scale of this project, its nature spanning multiple municipalities may result in difficulties with raising awareness, making it difficult to mobilise certain demographics, particularly among those who live in impoverished areas outside the main hubs/ municipalities. What this means in the context of some regions, is that some of the municipalities may not benefit equally, being that the number of municipalities per region outnumber the 13 projects to be awarded per territory. Noting this state-level discrepancy, one might argue that not enough is being done to avoid the exclusion of some individuals even on a more microcosmic level, especially comparing to the state budget’s municipal level counterparts – such as in the cycle conducted in Florianopolis analysed by Cataneo [12] – which saw a greater targeting of disadvantaged communities. The requirement of 100 signatures for any proposal [4] perhaps results in some areas being undermined in their decisions and even outright overlooked – specifically low population residencies in the rural fringes of each territory. If not enough votes are gathered, the proposal simply does not progress, no matter the significance. When combined with the self-selection methodology – favouring individuals with more political access – it should be asked whether the democratic innovation is thus doing all it can to aid the poorest of regions on a more targeted level. Perhaps state level participatory budgeting could benefit from further devolution – perhaps through hosting communal voting stages which precede the municipal-level voting stages.

Building upon the questionable inclusivity is the concept of popular control. Aspects of this involve the ability of citizens to exert their influence, as opposed to a process being entirely controlled by elites [9]. Using this, we question if participation in a democratic innovation has any meaningful consequence. In other words, did the process deliver on its promises, and how truly involved were citizens in making change occur. Methodologically, this can be partially applied to the implementation and agenda-setting process in the participatory budget. As previously mentioned, anyone can propose ideas for deliberation – perhaps reinforcing the case for popular control as the public decides for themselves what their needs are. However, the self-selected individuals involved may not adequately represent “the people” in its entirety. This issue bridges over into the sphere of popular control as it can be seen as an epistocratic exclusion. As people with less political knowledge are less inclined to participate in the first place meaning they cannot advocate for change on their own terms, also the prerequisite of signatures means further limitations. What has been done well in terms of popular control is the wide array of options granted to the citizenry to inform their proposals. The budget covers 15 thematic areas decided by the project organiser, including (but not limited to) health, women, sport, tourism etc. [4]. Though there is a 50% minimum investment in the health area, this is by no means a substantial constraint. As for results, the previous 2025 cycle shows significant investment into each territory, including the aforementioned example of the Maria Schmitt vetinary hospital [7], which aims to implement improved diagnostic services, such as the purchasing of newer machinery to aid in animal healthcare. Though, there is not much qualitative data regarding the successes of the project (such as opinion polls/ satisfaction scores etc), perhaps a result of the recency of the projects, and the varying completion status of projects. Yet, the implementation of these services is still evidential of PB adequately being able to translate claims into results reflective of communal needs, thus demonstrating that the conditions for popular control were partially met.

A key component of considered judgement is the quality of deliberation, specifically the extent to which participants engage with and reflect upon differing viewpoints. The answers to which lie in the methodology and process behind the democratic innovation. According to the coming 2026 proposal for Participatory Budgeting [4], the process is to see the voting and prioritisation of proposals by the delegates of each municipality in Santa Catarina. As this is a statewide initiative, with each municipality receiving a fixed amount, the deliberation occurs on an intra-regional level (between boroughs and cities as opposed to between territories). However, whether this is enough to fulfil Smith’s [9] democratic good is unclear as there has been historically little evidence to justify the quality of debates. What can be inferred however, making use of previous points, is that knowledgeable actors may inadvertently result in higher quality debates as opposed to when individuals with limited knowledge are involved. This, however, is purely speculative. Yet, what is made apparent in our case are the mediational efforts by municipal level entities following the implementation stage, such as the Florianopolis Union of Entities – which oversees the process in the municipality of Florianopolis, as cited by Cataneo [12]. This sees a governmental entity – the state of Santa Catarina as well as municipal unions – actively engaging with communities to identify local demands in order to arrive at an appropriate proposal. A legislative body participating in the process would lead to the perception of greater legitimacy than if the innovation saw little governmental involvement. Not only does this reflect a more structured approach to the initiative, but additionally the potential for well-informed debates, which is again somewhat reflective of Smith’s good. Whether the involvement of institutions will be seen to the same extent in Uczai’s newest scheme is still to be observed.

Now, we turn to Smith’s fourth democratic good, transparency. This relates to how a democratic innovation presents itself to the citizenry, how accessible is information regarding the innovation to the public. This is not accessibility in terms of participation, rather the ability for citizens to monitor the process and its outcomes. The experience of participatory budgeting in recent years saw varying results. Though, it is notable to mention that there is not one central document or site detailing the outcomes, the process is documented and outlined much better. Uczai’s proposal outlines the four-step funding and monitoring process to be carried out [4], as well as exactly which departments funds will be allocated to. As for previous years, though we are able to observe where money has gone in, there is no easily available paper trail. This goes against Smith’s principle of accountability. When talking about transparency, it is important for citizens to be able to use information to hold decision makers responsible. Whilst having produced measurable results, the initiative has consistently provided scattered data which can be used by the public in this regard. This has been found to be common of multiple other governmental matters [13]. What has been provided, is often located across different municipal portals, making it difficult to interpret. Moreover, data that can be found is often fragmented – for example, some results can be derived from the state transparency website transperencia.sc [14] yet are often found as non-searchable PDFs or map data – meaning that citizens must access multiple sites and piece data together. Ultimately, the facet of accountability, and by extension transparency, suffers due to the disorganised data. Though, one might posit that by a technicality, transparency is still being met – albeit in an unorthodox and inefficient fashion.

In Smith’s definition of efficiency, these previously mentioned weaknesses play an important role. Institutional performance is one of the definitive components of efficiency and relates to how economical – timewise and monetarily – a project is, as well as how effectively resources are translated into results. Final vote announcements are made through various channels, both formal and informal, such as on social media. For the 2025 project, winning projects such as the Ampliação do serviço de diagnóstico – Hospital Veterinário Maria Schmitt (Araranguá) – has little information regarding completion timelines making this aspect of efficiency difficult to analyse. However, what has not been analysed is the effort citizens gave across the whole project. Accounting for this, one might reinforce the case that Smith’s efficiency has been partially met. Citizen engagement in assemblies and proposal selection is relatively economical, requiring minimal time and resources from residents, illustrating not only financial efficiency but also efficacy in participation. However, this may present a trade-off in terms of participation. The limited effort required by citizens to participate means that the overall quality of participation is degraded. A more consultative role may mean sacrificing considered judgement as well as popular control. Fung [15, p. 68] notes the trade-offs between systems which focus on deliberative depth as opposed to efficiency. In systems which see less public participation officials may “commit to no more than receiving the testimony of participants and considering their views in their own subsequent deliberations”. The streamlining of the consultation phases risked underutilising the public and sacrificed aspects of popular control [9]. Nevertheless, it can be said that efficiency was adhered to.

The final democratic good that Smith mentions is transferability [9]. This is a simple feature to analyse, relating to the replicability over different contexts and time periods. One important dimension of the Participatory budgeting initiative that has not been thus far analysed is to be found in its origins. Gaspar and Teixeira [16, p. 5] note similarities among the PB initiative on the state level and Lisbon, Portugal. In particular, the use of thematic areas of investment – which still holds true in the initiative’s current version. This is evidential of the democratic innovation’s methodological replicability as well as transferability between contexts. In addition, the state level iteration exemplifies the scalability of the procedure, adapting from municipal to state level, clearly satisfactory of Smith’s definition. Another dimension is the sustainability of the practice. One way in which we can evaluate this is through the analysis of the funding. Some newer models of participatory budgeting, particularly in Europe, rely on outside funding from NGO’s (non-government organisations). As such, it has been critiqued by scholars such as Sintomer [2, p. 10] that these recent initiatives are less institutionally reliant, seeing investment on a more temporary basis. The experience in Santa Catarina has been rooted in government funded and legally ingrained projects, amplifying the sustainability of the practice as it has become more difficult to terminate funding without a legal basis. As such, one might argue that transferability is a core component of the South American initiative.

Ultimately, it has been observed that the experience Participatory Budgeting in Santa Catarina has seen trade-offs between different facets of Graham Smith’s democratic goods [9]. In essence, the practice has captured portions of each democratic good, albeit to varying degrees. As a result of methodological choices – particularly in the participant selection process– some goods were not able to be fully realised. Some goods such as efficiency and transferability were perhaps prioritised over others such as popular control or inclusion. The adaptations made to accommodate for the larger scale of the initiative – compared to the municipal level in Portugal and what has been recorded at the state level in Santa Catarina – can be hazardous in regards to meeting other goods, illustrating Smith’s claim that they exist in contention to one another. And whilst this may be true of the democratic innovation, it does not undermine the significance of the practice.

References

[1] Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge UP, 1970.

[2] Sintomer, Yves, Carsten Herzberg, and Anja Röcke. “Transnational Models of Citizen Participation: The Case of Participatory Budgeting.” Journal of Public Deliberation, vol. 8, no. 2, 2012.

[3] Gaspar, Renato Simões, et al. “Income Inequality and Non-Communicable Disease Mortality and Morbidity in Brazil States: A Longitudinal Analysis 2002–2017.” The Lancet Regional Health – Americas, vol. 2, 2021, article 100042. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lana.2021.100042 [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[4] Uczai, Pedro. Edital de Emendas do Orçamento Participativo: Deputado Federal Pedro Uczai – Orçamento 2027. 2026. Available at: https://pedrouczai.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Pedro-Uczai-Orcamento-Participativo-2026-3.pdf [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[5] Uczai, Pedro. “Orçamento Participativo do Deputado Federal Pedro Uczai Encerra Votação com Mais de 170 Mil Votos.” 2025. Available at: https://pedrouczai.com.br/orcamento-participativo-do-deputado-federal-pedro-uczai-encerra-votacao-com-mais-de-170-mil-votos/ [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[6] Uczai, Pedro. “Orçamento Participativo 2024.” 2024. Available at: https://pedrouczai.com.br/orcamento-participativo-2024/ [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[7] Governo do Estado de Santa Catarina. Diário Oficial do Estado de Santa Catarina, no. 22600-A, 17 Sept. 2025. Available at: https://portal.doe.sea.sc.gov.br/repositorio/2025/20250917/Jornal/22600-A.pdf [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[8] Melo, Milena Petters, and Rafael Hamilton Fernandes de Lima. “Participatory Democracy in Florianópolis: The Experience of Participatory Budgeting Based on Law No. 14.061/2018.” Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental, vol. 18, no. 3, 2024, e04036. Available at: https://doi.org/10.24857/rgsa.v18n3-004 [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[9] Smith, Graham. Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation. Cambridge UP, 2009.

[10] Abers, Rebecca. Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil. Lynne Rienner, 2000.

[11] Lefebvre, Henri. Le Droit à la Ville. Anthropos, 1968.

[12] Cataneo, Fernando B. O Desenho Institucional do Orçamento Legislativo Participativo de Florianópolis: Um Estudo de Caso Sobre Uma Inovação Democrática Local. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2021. Available at: https://repositorio.ufsc.br/handle/123456789/226829 [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[13] Carneiro, R., et al. Transparency and Public Data Accessibility in Brazilian Governance. 2023.

[14] Governo do Estado de Santa Catarina. Portal da Transparência de Santa Catarina. Available at: https://www.transparencia.sc.gov.br [Accessed: 08/05/2026].

[15] Fung, Archon. “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance.” Public Administration Review, vol. 66, 2006, pp. 66–75.

[16] Gaspar, R., and A. Teixeira. Participatory Budgeting in Florianópolis: Origins and Institutionalisation. 2017.