The Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities was an arms-length initiative established by the Government of Canada to engage with stakeholders on the phase-out of coal-fired electricity generation.
Problems and Purpose:
The negative impacts of the phase-out of coal-fired power in Canada will be concentrated in specific communities.[i] To address this, the government convened a Task Force in 2018 to consult with stakeholders, workers in the coal-fired power generation sector, and communities where existing coal plants would be closed down.[ii]
The use of an arm’s-length task force is useful, as it allowed the government to include members of impacted communities within the membership of the task force, enabling the force to act with greater legitimacy.[iii] This perceived legitimacy facilitated engagement with affected communities, increasing the representativeness of the findings and conclusions drawn by the task force, while concurrently reducing polarization.[iv]
Background History and Context:
In 2015, the Government of Canada was a signatory to the Paris Agreement, an international treaty on climate change that aims to limit global temperature rises below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.[v] To assist with meeting the commitments it made through the agreement, in 2016 the Government of Canada announced that it would phase out the production of coal-fired electricity by 2030.[vi] However, following this announcement, the government received criticism for failing to acknowledge how the impacts of this policy would be disproportionately felt across the country.[vii] As expected, the announcement of the phase-out was denounced by some coal-producing provincial governments, but a bulk of this policy’s criticism actually came from the labour movement.[viii]
For decades, the labour movement has advanced the concept of a just transition – the belief that governments should make a concerted effort to share the costs of transitioning Canada to a low-carbon economy.[ix] Scholars and activists acknowledge that a transition to a low carbon economy cannot be just unless workers and other stakeholders are engaged in the process to determine what that future looks like.[x] From this engagement, ideally the costs of the transition will be shared across society, not isolated to particular communities or industries.[xi]
To address this criticism, the Minister of the Environment, Catherine McKenna, announced the creation of the Just Transition Task Force, outlining its mandate and proposed membership in the Force’s terms of reference.[xii] Several months later, the membership of the Task Force was announced publicly and the members began their work.[xiii]
This is not the first time that the Government of Canada has used the method of a task force to engage Canadians in the process of developing a policy agenda. The governing Liberal Party has developed several task forces while in office, such as the Task Force on Marijuana Legalization and Regulation.[xiv]
Despite the popularity of the task force model in Canada, the Task Force on Just Transition contained several innovative participatory democratic approaches. First, the large presence of organized labour on the council, particularly those affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress, could be framed as an official collaboration between a non-state actor and the government – something that is not commonly found in the model of a task force. This is further reinforced when one considers Canada’s partnership with the International Trade Union Confederation (to which the CLC is an affiliate member of) on providing analysis to support just transitions in the global south.[xv] In the Task Force’s background document, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Canada explicitly acknowledge how the force contributes to this partnership with organized labour.[xvi] With this in mind, the Task Force on Just Transition could be understood to be an example of co-ownership between the Government of Canada and the Canadian labour movement. This differs significantly from the traditional task force model, where experts are convened by and act on behalf of the government, not in their capacity as members of civil society organizations.[xvii]
Another novel feature was that the Task Force members took an explicitly iterative approach to engaging with the public, changing their tactics when they faced opposition from participants– making them more responsive than the traditional task force with a static consultative model.[xviii]
Finally, climate change is a wicked problem that impacts all jurisdictions. Other countries with an active fossil fuel industry could learn from the case of the Task Force on Just Transition to build stronger practices of worker engagement in climate change policy development.
Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities:
The Task Force was established by Environment and Climate Change Canada, a federal ministry.[xix] Its Cabinet minister, Catherine McKenna, was responsible for appointing the task forces’ members and setting the force’s mandate. Members were also tasked with reporting their findings back to Minister McKenna nine months after the formation of the council.[xx]
Environment and Climate Change Canada also funded the task force.[xxi] However, it is unclear exactly how much money was set aside to fund this initiative. Members were not compensated for their work, although honoraria were made available for those who were not being paid to perform activities related to their work on the force (i.e., those employed by trade unions or as political representatives). The ministry also provided task force members with a small pool of staff (a secretariat) to support their work by completing tasks like data collection.[xxii]
Participant Recruitment and Selection:
The task force’s terms of reference outlined the size and ideal candidates for the task force.[xxiii] This included two chairs and nine general members with qualifications predetermined by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. The Task Force was comprised of experts in workforce and sustainable development, a past executive from a Canadian electricity utility, a municipal representative, representatives from the Canadian Labour Congress and a provincial federation of labour, and representatives from unions representing workers in coal extraction, coal power generation, and the skilled trades related to coal power. Decisions on who sat on the council were made by the Ministry and the CLC (who chose who would represent their organization).[xxiv]
Similarly, the task force’s terms of reference outlined the stakeholders that they were asked to engage with.[xxv] This included:
- Communities where the coal power sector is active;
- Labour organizations that represent workers in the coal power sector and their members;
- Industry involved in the coal power sector;
- Clean Tech companies that use innovation to reduce environmental impact and to drive economic development;
- Finance organizations who hold perspectives on future economic opportunities; and
- Academics and NGOs whose research may glean insight on the task force’s mandate.[xxvi]
The Task Force did targeted outreach to these stakeholder groups but had an open portal on its website to collect submissions from other groups and individuals.[xxvii] Of those that were targeted, the secretariat compiled a list of stakeholders which task force members also added names and organizations to.[xxviii]
The communities where consultations took place were outlined by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change.[xxix] All members of these communities were welcome to participate in consultations.
Methods and Tools Used:
Task forces are a popular way that the Government of Canada engages with its citizens. These are differentiated from other external processes for policy review, like royal commissions, because they are not legally autonomous from the government and are less likely to conduct independent research on the topic at hand.[xxx] Because these forces are often led by key stakeholders or experts and are given a mandate to engage in consultation with other stakeholders and the general public, they are a useful innovation to collect feedback from people and groups across a policy network.[xxxi]
The Task Force engaged in several different methods to engage with the public:
- Stakeholder Engagement: one-on-one meetings with groups affected by the coal transition. These sessions aimed to produce a two-way dialogue where both the task force and stakeholders could ask questions and share information with one another.[xxxii]
- Online Portal: a website where individuals could provide the task force with written submissions. This is in line with previous digital participatory initiatives adopted by the Canadian government.[xxxiii]
- Site Visits: tours of facilities where stakeholders were engaged with directly in their place of work.[xxxiv]
- Town Halls: meetings where dialogue occurred between the task force and impacted individuals.[xxxv]
What Went On:
Over the nine months that the Task Force was convened, the members engaged with 80 stakeholder groups through meetings, both virtual and in-person.[xxxvi] Through these stakeholder meetings, the Task Force members were able to learn more about how the looming coal phase out was already being addressed in affected communities.[xxxvii]
The Force also made trips to all four provinces impacted by the coal phase out.[xxxviii] In total, the Task Force visited fifteen communities in Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. During these visits, the members toured five power generating station, two mines, and one port. Through these tours, the members were also able to receive input and ask questions from workers and companies directly.[xxxix]
Another broader way that the Task Force engaged with the public was through public town hall meetings.[xl] The Force hosted eight of these town halls, where participants were encouraged to ask questions about the federal phase out, provide comments on the transition, and suggest potential solutions to facilitate a just transition.[xli] The Task Force members emphasized that these meetings were opportunities for two-way dialogue between participants and the members.[xlii] The Task Force members conceptualized this dialogue as an opportunity for participants to learn about the federal government’s new regulations and for Task Force members to learn from participants what their concerns, hopes, and recommendations were for the future of their jobs and communities.[xliii]
As noted previously, the Task Force members took an iterative approach to these meetings, learning as they went along how to best engage members of affected communities.[xliv] A small group of Task Force members would attend each meeting, some of them with hundreds of participants in attendance.[xlv] Meetings would last approximately 3-4 hours. Each meeting was led by one of the co-chairs, who were trained to facilitate discussion amongst the participants. At times the mood of the meetings were quite charged – with one Task Force member remarking after the fact that participants were, “angry as hell, and in some cases rightly so”.[xlvi]
These consultations, alongside economic analysis conducted by their supporting secretariat, informed the contents of two reports, which were presented to Minister McKenna at the end of 2018.[xlvii] The first report contained analysis of the committee’s findings and a list of ten recommendations for the federal government to facilitate a just transition in the coal sector.[xlviii] The recommendations contained in the first report include the following:
- Develop, communicate, implement, monitor, evaluate and publicly report on a just transition plan for the coal phase-out, championed by a lead minister to oversee and report on progress.
- Include provisions for just transition in federal environmental and labour legislation and regulations, as well as relevant intergovernmental agreements.
- Establish a targeted, long-term research fund for studying the impact of the coal phase-out and the transition to a low-carbon economy.
- Fund the establishment and operation of locally driven transition centers in affected coal communities.
- Create a pension bridging program for workers who will retire earlier than planned due to the coal phase-out.
- Create a detailed and publicly available inventory with labor market information pertaining to coal workers, such as skills profiles, demographics, locations, and current and potential employers.
- Create a comprehensive funding program for workers staying in the labor market to address their needs across the stages of securing a new job, including income support, education and skills building, re-employment, and mobility.
- Identify, prioritize and fund local infrastructure projects in affected communities.
- Establish a dedicated, comprehensive, inclusive and flexible just transition funding program for affected communities.
- Meet directly with affected communities to learn about their local priorities, and to connect them with federal programs that could support their goals.[xlix]
The second report summarized the key points that the task force heard during their consultations, disaggregated by province.[l] It also noted what is currently being done in each jurisdiction to facilitate a coal phase-out and support workers along the way. Finally, the second report identified several considerations that must be made to underpin a just transition, justified by connecting these considerations to the concerns raised by participants.[li]
Influence, Outcomes, and Effects:
The Task Force’s recommendations have gone on to shape the federal government’s development of future just transition policies. The 2019 budget supported several initiatives related to the Force’s recommendations, including funding for worker transition centres for affected communities, a $150 million infrastructure fund for these same communities, and a commitment to explore wage and pension protections for workers impacted by the coal phase out.[lii]
Natural Resources Canada built upon the work of the Task Force in 2021 and 2022, hosting 17 additional engagement sessions on a “people-centred transition” to a low-carbon economy, alongside digital engagement through an email submission process and a Twitter hashtag (#JustTransition).[liii]
Further, the federal government has affirmed other recommendations through the creation of the interim Sustainable Jobs Action Plan (itself fulfilling recommendation 1).[liv] This was established through Bill C-50, An Act respecting accountability, transparency and engagement to support the creation of sustainable jobs for workers and economic growth in a net-zero economy. The bill, which passed in 2023, sets the groundwork for the establishment of a Sustainable Jobs Partnership Council to fulfill the additional consultative work that the Task Force recommended. The framework for fulfilling all of the aforementioned Task Force recommendations, except for those recommending a dedicated research fund and pension-bridging policy, can be seen throughout the bill. A more thorough Sustainable Jobs Action Plan will be launched in 2025.[lv] The Canadian labour movement played a major role in co-constructing this policy and were subsequently recognized for their contributions at the bill’s announcement.[lvi] Bea Bruske, the current CLC president, called Bill C-50 an “unprecedented opportunity” for labour and the federal government to collaborate.[lvii]
The use of the term “sustainable jobs” rather than “just transition” for this new piece of legislation is also relevant, as the Task Force found that workers responded poorly to the idea that their jobs were “dirty” and needed to be phased out.[lviii] The federal government’s choice in framing their new initiatives as “sustainable jobs” is deliberate, with an explicit focus on how a phase-out of emitting energy production will bring about job opportunities, growth, and inclusivity.[lix] With this in mind, the Task Force on Just Transition has had a transformative effect on the discourse used within this policy debate in Canada.
Analysis and Lessons Learned:
All of the scholarship that has examined the Task Force on Just Transition has viewed its work favourably. The European Commission published a case study report on the Task Force to support its Just Transition Platform.[lx] This suggests that Canada’s work on facilitating a just transition has been influential beyond its borders.
Comparative research between Canada’s Just Transition Task Force and a comparable commission in Germany suggests that Canada’s Task Force did a better job of recognizing regional perspectives in its work and recommendations.[lxi] Gürtler et al. attribute this to the force’s mandate to build local legitimacy, rather than national legitimacy – which they argue made the Task Force’s work more responsive to the people that were consulted. These researchers noted that a national mandate to phase out coal required bottom-up legitimation from regions and municipalities. This influenced the task force to rely on what the authors consider to be radically participatory processes to be successful in their goals.[lxii]
The use of a task force to collect feedback and inform stakeholders was perceived as a positive method by members of the Task Force.[lxiii] The arm’s length nature of the Task Force’s structure allowed the members to operate with greater legitimacy.[lxiv] They were not required to temper their recommendations to a particular government’s will, allowing the final recommendations within the report to be more responsive to participants’ perspectives.[lxv] Some Task Force members framed their roles as advocates for those that they were speaking to.[lxvi] For instance, one task force member recounted,
“A lot of people said, ‘Why are you doing it? Don’t do it, let’s phase it out longer’ and we said ‘No, that’s not why we’re here, to negotiate changes to what the federal government has decided. We’re here to listen to you, how this is going to impact you, and what we can do to help’. They go ‘You work for the government’ and we said ‘No, we’re here to listen to you, to take your message back to the government’”.[lxvii]
From reading the two published reports, it is clear how the participants’ input shaped the Task Force’s recommendations and ultimately the government’s actions. In each report, when presenting a recommendation, the Task Force members first identify a summary of what it was that they heard from workers that led them to adopt each recommendation. Paired alongside each summary is a direct quote from a participant to further contextualize the opinions expressed in each report. The reports then use the language of, “based on what we heard, we recommend that the government of Canada…” to present their recommendations.[lxviii] This framing emphasized the participatory nature of the Task Force, showcasing that these were people-driven, rather than elite-driven, recommendations.
The structure of the Task Force also served to reduce the polarization of the coal phase out debate.[lxix] Researchers at the University of Ottawa note that the Task Force’s neutral, non-partisan nature, the commitments of task force members, and the iterative approach taken to consultations supported decreased polarization.[lxx]
Some of the additional lessons learned through the Task Force are reflected in the changes made to the composition of the Sustainable Jobs Partnership Council. While similar groups are represented in the suggested membership, the phrasing of the new council’s mandate seems to place a greater emphasis on lived experience.[lxxi] While labour will still be well represented on the new council – not explicitly asking for representatives from specific labour organizations may provide the new council with greater flexibility to choose individuals who work in coal power generation and are leaders within their local. This will address criticism about the Task Force not having representation from directly impacted workers.[lxxii]
One additional critique to be levied at the task force is its lack of deliberation between participants. This could be attributed to the “fact-finding” mandate of the task force. It was tasked with collecting feedback from stakeholders to inform a Canadian strategy to facilitate a just transition – not to directly facilitate such a transition. This critique could also be levied upon other participatory programs adopted to bring about just transitions in other jurisdictions, as task forces and commissions have been used to facilitate dialogue on just transitions in Germany, Scotland, and by the United Nations.[lxxiii] Perhaps the new Canadian Sustainable Jobs Partnership Council could rectify this, encouraging deliberation at the local level to develop policies tailored to local needs, as the Just Transition Task Force recommended.[lxxiv] There is a precedence for deliberative principles being applied to just transitions policy, with Scotland launching a participatory budget fund in 2023 – which could be used as a model for future, more participatory engagement on facilitating a just transition in Canada.[lxxv]
Case Entry – Text Description
Brief Description:
Problems and Purpose:
The negative impacts of the phase-out of coal-fired power in Canada will be concentrated in specific communities.[i] To address this, the government convened a Task Force in 2018 to consult with stakeholders, workers in the coal-fired power generation sector, and communities where existing coal plants would be closed down.[ii]
The use of an arm’s-length task force is useful, as it allowed the government to include members of impacted communities within the membership of the task force, enabling the force to act with greater legitimacy.[iii] This perceived legitimacy facilitated engagement with affected communities, increasing the representativeness of the findings and conclusions drawn by the task force, while concurrently reducing polarization.[iv]
Background History and Context:
In 2015, the Government of Canada was a signatory to the Paris Agreement, an international treaty on climate change that aims to limit global temperature rises below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.[v] To assist with meeting the commitments it made through the agreement, in 2016 the Government of Canada announced that it would phase out the production of coal-fired electricity by 2030.[vi] However, following this announcement, the government received criticism for failing to acknowledge how the impacts of this policy would be disproportionately felt across the country.[vii] As expected, the announcement of the phase-out was denounced by some coal-producing provincial governments, but a bulk of this policy’s criticism actually came from the labour movement.[viii]
For decades, the labour movement has advanced the concept of a just transition – the belief that governments should make a concerted effort to share the costs of transitioning Canada to a low-carbon economy.[ix] Scholars and activists acknowledge that a transition to a low carbon economy cannot be just unless workers and other stakeholders are engaged in the process to determine what that future looks like.[x] From this engagement, ideally the costs of the transition will be shared across society, not isolated to particular communities or industries.[xi]
To address this criticism, the Minister of the Environment, Catherine McKenna, announced the creation of the Just Transition Task Force, outlining its mandate and proposed membership in the Force’s terms of reference.[xii] Several months later, the membership of the Task Force was announced publicly and the members began their work.[xiii]
This is not the first time that the Government of Canada has used the method of a task force to engage Canadians in the process of developing a policy agenda. The governing Liberal Party has developed several task forces while in office, such as the Task Force on Marijuana Legalization and Regulation.[xiv]
Despite the popularity of the task force model in Canada, the Task Force on Just Transition contained several innovative participatory democratic approaches. First, the large presence of organized labour on the council, particularly those affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress, could be framed as an official collaboration between a non-state actor and the government – something that is not commonly found in the model of a task force. This is further reinforced when one considers Canada’s partnership with the International Trade Union Confederation (to which the CLC is an affiliate member of) on providing analysis to support just transitions in the global south.[xv] In the Task Force’s background document, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Canada explicitly acknowledge how the force contributes to this partnership with organized labour.[xvi] With this in mind, the Task Force on Just Transition could be understood to be an example of co-ownership between the Government of Canada and the Canadian labour movement. This differs significantly from the traditional task force model, where experts are convened by and act on behalf of the government, not in their capacity as members of civil society organizations.[xvii]
Another novel feature was that the Task Force members took an explicitly iterative approach to engaging with the public, changing their tactics when they faced opposition from participants– making them more responsive than the traditional task force with a static consultative model.[xviii]
Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities:
The Task Force was established by Environment and Climate Change Canada, a federal ministry.[xix] Its Cabinet minister, Catherine McKenna, was responsible for appointing the task forces’ members and setting the force’s mandate. Members were also tasked with reporting their findings back to Minister McKenna nine months after the formation of the council.[xx]
Environment and Climate Change Canada also funded the task force.[xxi] However, it is unclear exactly how much money was set aside to fund this initiative. Members were not compensated for their work, although honoraria were made available for those who were not being paid to perform activities related to their work on the force (i.e., those employed by trade unions or as political representatives). The ministry also provided task force members with a small pool of staff (a secretariat) to support their work by completing tasks like data collection.[xxii]
Participant Recruitment and Selection:
The task force’s terms of reference outlined the size and ideal candidates for the task force.[xxiii] This included two chairs and nine general members with qualifications predetermined by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. The Task Force was comprised of experts in workforce and sustainable development, a past executive from a Canadian electricity utility, a municipal representative, representatives from the Canadian Labour Congress and a provincial federation of labour, and representatives from unions representing workers in coal extraction, coal power generation, and the skilled trades related to coal power. Decisions on who sat on the council were made by the Ministry and the CLC (who chose who would represent their organization).[xxiv]
Similarly, the task force’s terms of reference outlined the stakeholders that they were asked to engage with.[xxv] This included:
· Communities where the coal power sector is active;
· Labour organizations that represent workers in the coal power sector and their members;
· Industry involved in the coal power sector;
· Clean Tech companies that use innovation to reduce environmental impact and to drive economic development;
· Finance organizations who hold perspectives on future economic opportunities; and
· Academics and NGOs whose research may glean insight on the task force’s mandate.[xxvi]
The Task Force did targeted outreach to these stakeholder groups but had an open portal on its website to collect submissions from other groups and individuals.[xxvii] Of those that were targeted, the secretariat compiled a list of stakeholders which task force members also added names and organizations to.[xxviii]
The communities where consultations took place were outlined by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change.[xxix] All members of these communities were welcome to participate in consultations.
Methods and Tools Used:
Task forces are a popular way that the Government of Canada engages with its citizens. These are differentiated from other external processes for policy review, like royal commissions, because they are not legally autonomous from the government and are less likely to conduct independent research on the topic at hand.[xxx] Because these forces are often led by key stakeholders or experts and are given a mandate to engage in consultation with other stakeholders and the general public, they are a useful innovation to collect feedback from people and groups across a policy network.[xxxi]
The Task Force engaged in several different methods to engage with the public:
· Stakeholder Engagement: one-on-one meetings with groups affected by the coal transition. These sessions aimed to produce a two-way dialogue where both the task force and stakeholders could ask questions and share information with one another.[xxxii]
· Online Portal: a website where individuals could provide the task force with written submissions. This is in line with previous digital participatory initiatives adopted by the Canadian government.[xxxiii]
· Site Visits: tours of facilities where stakeholders were engaged with directly in their place of work.[xxxiv]
· Town Halls: meetings where dialogue occurred between the task force and impacted individuals.[xxxv]
What Went On:
Over the nine months that the Task Force was convened, the members engaged with 80 stakeholder groups through meetings, both virtual and in-person.[xxxvi] Through these stakeholder meetings, the Task Force members were able to learn more about how the looming coal phase out was already being addressed in affected communities.[xxxvii]
The Force also made trips to all four provinces impacted by the coal phase out.[xxxviii] In total, the Task Force visited fifteen communities in Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. During these visits, the members toured five power generating station, two mines, and one port. Through these tours, the members were also able to receive input and ask questions from workers and companies directly.[xxxix]
Another broader way that the Task Force engaged with the public was through public town hall meetings.[xl] The Force hosted eight of these town halls, where participants were encouraged to ask questions about the federal phase out, provide comments on the transition, and suggest potential solutions to facilitate a just transition.[xli] The Task Force members emphasized that these meetings were opportunities for two-way dialogue between participants and the members.[xlii] The Task Force members conceptualized this dialogue as an opportunity for participants to learn about the federal government’s new regulations and for Task Force members to learn from participants what their concerns, hopes, and recommendations were for the future of their jobs and communities.[xliii]
As noted previously, the Task Force members took an iterative approach to these meetings, learning as they went along how to best engage members of affected communities.[xliv] A small group of Task Force members would attend each meeting, some of them with hundreds of participants in attendance.[xlv] Meetings would last approximately 3-4 hours. Each meeting was led by one of the co-chairs, who were trained to facilitate discussion amongst the participants. At times the mood of the meetings were quite charged – with one Task Force member remarking after the fact that participants were, “angry as hell, and in some cases rightly so”.[xlvi]
These consultations, alongside economic analysis conducted by their supporting secretariat, informed the contents of two reports, which were presented to Minister McKenna at the end of 2018.[xlvii] The first report contained analysis of the committee’s findings and a list of ten recommendations for the federal government to facilitate a just transition in the coal sector.[xlviii] The recommendations contained in the first report include the following:
1. Develop, communicate, implement, monitor, evaluate and publicly report on a just transition plan for the coal phase-out, championed by a lead minister to oversee and report on progress.
2. Include provisions for just transition in federal environmental and labour legislation and regulations, as well as relevant intergovernmental agreements.
3. Establish a targeted, long-term research fund for studying the impact of the coal phase-out and the transition to a low-carbon economy.
4. Fund the establishment and operation of locally driven transition centers in affected coal communities.
5. Create a pension bridging program for workers who will retire earlier than planned due to the coal phase-out.
6. Create a detailed and publicly available inventory with labor market information pertaining to coal workers, such as skills profiles, demographics, locations, and current and potential employers.
7. Create a comprehensive funding program for workers staying in the labor market to address their needs across the stages of securing a new job, including income support, education and skills building, re-employment, and mobility.
8. Identify, prioritize and fund local infrastructure projects in affected communities.
9. Establish a dedicated, comprehensive, inclusive and flexible just transition funding program for affected communities.
10. Meet directly with affected communities to learn about their local priorities, and to connect them with federal programs that could support their goals.[xlix]
The second report summarized the key points that the task force heard during their consultations, disaggregated by province.[l] It also noted what is currently being done in each jurisdiction to facilitate a coal phase-out and support workers along the way. Finally, the second report identified several considerations that must be made to underpin a just transition, justified by connecting these considerations to the concerns raised by participants.[li]
Influence, Outcomes, and Effects:
The Task Force’s recommendations have gone on to shape the federal government’s development of future just transition policies. The 2019 budget supported several initiatives related to the Force’s recommendations, including funding for worker transition centres for affected communities, a $150 million infrastructure fund for these same communities, and a commitment to explore wage and pension protections for workers impacted by the coal phase out.[lii]
Natural Resources Canada built upon the work of the Task Force in 2021 and 2022, hosting 17 additional engagement sessions on a “people-centred transition” to a low-carbon economy, alongside digital engagement through an email submission process and a Twitter hashtag (#JustTransition).[liii]
Further, the federal government has affirmed other recommendations through the creation of the interim Sustainable Jobs Action Plan (itself fulfilling recommendation 1).[liv] This was established through Bill C-50, An Act respecting accountability, transparency and engagement to support the creation of sustainable jobs for workers and economic growth in a net-zero economy. The bill, which passed in 2023, sets the groundwork for the establishment of a Sustainable Jobs Partnership Council to fulfill the additional consultative work that the Task Force recommended. The framework for fulfilling all of the aforementioned Task Force recommendations, except for those recommending a dedicated research fund and pension-bridging policy, can be seen throughout the bill. A more thorough Sustainable Jobs Action Plan will be launched in 2025.[lv] The Canadian labour movement played a major role in co-constructing this policy and were subsequently recognized for their contributions at the bill’s announcement.[lvi] Bea Bruske, the current CLC president, called Bill C-50 an “unprecedented opportunity” for labour and the federal government to collaborate.[lvii]
The use of the term “sustainable jobs” rather than “just transition” for this new piece of legislation is also relevant, as the Task Force found that workers responded poorly to the idea that their jobs were “dirty” and needed to be phased out.[lviii] The federal government’s choice in framing their new initiatives as “sustainable jobs” is deliberate, with an explicit focus on how a phase-out of emitting energy production will bring about job opportunities, growth, and inclusivity.[lix] With this in mind, the Task Force on Just Transition has had a transformative effect on the discourse used within this policy debate in Canada.
Analysis and Lessons Learned:
All of the scholarship that has examined the Task Force on Just Transition has viewed its work favourably. The European Commission published a case study report on the Task Force to support its Just Transition Platform.[lx] This suggests that Canada’s work on facilitating a just transition has been influential beyond its borders.
Comparative research between Canada’s Just Transition Task Force and a comparable commission in Germany suggests that Canada’s Task Force did a better job of recognizing regional perspectives in its work and recommendations.[lxi] Gürtler et al. attribute this to the force’s mandate to build local legitimacy, rather than national legitimacy – which they argue made the Task Force’s work more responsive to the people that were consulted. These researchers noted that a national mandate to phase out coal required bottom-up legitimation from regions and municipalities. This influenced the task force to rely on what the authors consider to be radically participatory processes to be successful in their goals.[lxii]
The use of a task force to collect feedback and inform stakeholders was perceived as a positive method by members of the Task Force.[lxiii] The arm’s length nature of the Task Force’s structure allowed the members to operate with greater legitimacy.[lxiv] They were not required to temper their recommendations to a particular government’s will, allowing the final recommendations within the report to be more responsive to participants’ perspectives.[lxv] Some Task Force members framed their roles as advocates for those that they were speaking to.[lxvi] For instance, one task force member recounted,
“A lot of people said, ‘Why are you doing it? Don’t do it, let’s phase it out longer’ and we said ‘No, that’s not why we’re here, to negotiate changes to what the federal government has decided. We’re here to listen to you, how this is going to impact you, and what we can do to help’. They go ‘You work for the government’ and we said ‘No, we’re here to listen to you, to take your message back to the government’”.[lxvii]
From reading the two published reports, it is clear how the participants’ input shaped the Task Force’s recommendations and ultimately the government’s actions. In each report, when presenting a recommendation, the Task Force members first identify a summary of what it was that they heard from workers that led them to adopt each recommendation. Paired alongside each summary is a direct quote from a participant to further contextualize the opinions expressed in each report. The reports then use the language of, “based on what we heard, we recommend that the government of Canada…” to present their recommendations.[lxviii] This framing emphasized the participatory nature of the Task Force, showcasing that these were people-driven, rather than elite-driven, recommendations.
The structure of the Task Force also served to reduce the polarization of the coal phase out debate.[lxix] Researchers at the University of Ottawa note that the Task Force’s neutral, non-partisan nature, the commitments of task force members, and the iterative approach taken to consultations supported decreased polarization.[lxx]
Some of the additional lessons learned through the Task Force are reflected in the changes made to the composition of the Sustainable Jobs Partnership Council. While similar groups are represented in the suggested membership, the phrasing of the new council’s mandate seems to place a greater emphasis on lived experience.[lxxi] While labour will still be well represented on the new council – not explicitly asking for representatives from specific labour organizations may provide the new council with greater flexibility to choose individuals who work in coal power generation and are leaders within their local. This will address criticism about the Task Force not having representation from directly impacted workers.[lxxii]
One additional critique to be levied at the task force is its lack of deliberation between participants. This could be attributed to the “fact-finding” mandate of the task force. It was tasked with collecting feedback from stakeholders to inform a Canadian strategy to facilitate a just transition – not to directly facilitate such a transition. This critique could also be levied upon other participatory programs adopted to bring about just transitions in other jurisdictions, as task forces and commissions have been used to facilitate dialogue on just transitions in Germany, Scotland, and by the United Nations.[lxxiii] Perhaps the new Canadian Sustainable Jobs Partnership Council could rectify this, encouraging deliberation at the local level to develop policies tailored to local needs, as the Just Transition Task Force recommended.[lxxiv] There is a precedence for deliberative principles being applied to just transitions policy, with Scotland launching a participatory budget fund in 2023 – which could be used as a model for future, more participatory engagement on facilitating a just transition in Canada.[lxxv]
References
[i] “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[ii] Ibid
[iii] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf
[iv] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf; Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.
[v] “The Paris Agreement,” Government of Canada, January 6, 2016, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/paris-agreement.html
[vi] Kathleen Harris, “Liberals present plan to phase out coal-powered electricity by 2030,” CBC News, November 21, 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-coal-electricity-phase-out-1.3860131
[vii] Ibid
[viii] Geoff Evans & Liam Phelan, “Transition to a post-carbon society: Linking environmental justice and just transition discourses,” Energy Policy 99, (2016): 329-339.; Kathleen Harris, “Liberals present plan to phase out coal-powered electricity by 2030,” CBC News, November 21, 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-coal-electricity-phase-out-1.3860131; Pierre Ducasse & Matthew Firth, “Just Transition: Why we need to look before the leap,” Canadian Union of Public Employees, October 3, 2016, https://cupe.ca/just-transition-why-we-need-look-we-leap; “This Earth Day, unions are calling for a carbon reduction strategy for workers and communities,” Canadian Labour Congress, April 22, 2018, https://canadianlabour.ca/news-news-archive-earth-day-unions-are-calling-carbon-reduction-strategy-workers-and-communities/
[ix] Geoff Evans & Liam Phelan, “Transition to a post-carbon society: Linking environmental justice and just transition discourses,” Energy Policy 99, (2016): 329-339; Green Economy Network Steering Committee, “Making the Shift to a Green Economy: A Common Platform of the Green Economy Network,” Green Economy Network, 2016, https://documents.clcctc.ca/hse/GEN-Common-Platform-2016-04-22-EN.pdf
[x] Geoff Evans & Liam Phelan, “Transition to a post-carbon society: Linking environmental justice and just transition discourses,” Energy Policy 99, (2016): 329-339; Green Economy Network Steering Committee, “Making the Shift to a Green Economy: A Common Platform of the Green Economy Network,” Green Economy Network, 2016, https://documents.clcctc.ca/hse/GEN-Common-Platform-2016-04-22-EN.pdf
[xi] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf; Hadrien Mertins-Kirkwood, “Evaluating government plans and actions to reduce GHG emissions in Canada: Just transition policies [Working Paper],” Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, (2017), https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/24c6929f-78d3-4368-a689-501dc86ccfb9/content; Raphael J. Heffron, Achieving a Just Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.; Sean Sweeney & John Treat, “Trade Unions and Just Transition: The Search for a Transformative Politics [Working Paper],” Trade Unions for Energy Democracy, January 1, 2018, https://www.tuedglobal.org/working-papers/trade-unions-and-just-transition-the-search-for-a-transformative-politics
[xii] “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[xiii] Stefanie Marotta, “Coal phase-out task force to consult workers, communities to soften blow,” CBC News, April 25, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mckenna-task-force-coal-phase-out-1.4635379
[xiv] “Canadian Task Force on Marijuana Legalization and Regulation,” Participedia, December 13, 2019, https://participedia.net/case/5539
[xv] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf
[xvi] Ibid
[xvii] Michael Howlett & Anthony Maragna, “How big is a policy network? An assessment utilizing data from Canadian royal commissions 1970–2000,” Review of Policy Research, 23, no. 2 (2006):433-452.; Robert A. Young, “Reining in James: the limits of the task force,” Canadian Public Administration, 24, no. 4, (1981): 596-611.
[xviii] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf
[xix] “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[xx] Ibid
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] Ibid
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] Ibid
[xxv] Ibid
[xxvi] Ibid
[xxvii] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf
[xxviii] Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.
[xxix] “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[xxx] Gregory P. Marchildon, “Royal Commissions and the Policy Cycle in Canada: The Case of Health Care [Working Paper],” Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, (2001), https://ourspace.uregina.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/fcd4bfa5-dccf-4bb9-aac6-bbf5d7c9009e/content
[xxxi] Michael Howlett & Anthony Maragna, “How big is a policy network? An assessment utilizing data from Canadian royal commissions 1970–2000,” Review of Policy Research, 23, no. 2 (2006):433-452.; Robert A. Young, “Reining in James: the limits of the task force,” Canadian Public Administration, 24, no. 4, (1981): 596-611.
[xxxii] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf; “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[xxxiii] Justin Longo, “The evolution of citizen and stakeholder engagement in Canada, from Spicer to #Hashtags,” Canadian Public Administration, 60, no. 4 (2017): 517-537.; “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[xxxiv] “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[xxxv] Ibid
[xxxvi] Ibid
[xxxvii] Ibid
[xxxviii] Ibid
[xxxix] Ibid
[xl] ibid
[xli] Ibid
[xlii] Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.
[xliii] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf; Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.; “What We Heard from Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-362-2019-eng.pdf
[xliv] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf
[xlv] Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.
[xlvi] Ibid
[xlvii] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf
[xlviii] Ibid
[xlix] Ibid
[l] “Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities Terms of Reference,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, March 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/task-force-just-transition.html#summary-details1
[li] Ibid
[lii] “Budget 2019: Investing in the Middle Class,” Government of Canada, March 19, 2019, https://www.budget.canada.ca/2019/home-accueil-en.html
[liii] “Just Transition,” Natural Resources Canada, accessed on July 20, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210720173827/https://www.rncanengagenrcan.ca/en/collections/just-transition; “Sustainable Jobs Plan,” Government of Canada, May 25, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/training/initiatives/sustainable-jobs/plan.html#s6
[liv] “Sustainable Jobs Plan,” Government of Canada, May 25, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/training/initiatives/sustainable-jobs/plan.html#s6
[lv] Ibid
[lvi] Natasha Bulowski, “Sustainable jobs bill could give unions a voice in feds' energy transition plans,” Canada’s National Observer, June 16, 2023, https://www.nationalobserver.com/2023/06/16/news/federal-sustainable-jobs-bill-unions
[lvii] Ibid
[lviii] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf
[lix] Peter Mazereeuw, “Politics This Morning: Don’t call it Just Transition—but it’s ready,” The Hill Times, June 15, 2023, https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2023/06/15/politics-this-morning-dont-call-it-just-transition-but-its-ready/390345/ ; “Sustainable Jobs Plan,” Government of Canada, May 25, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/training/initiatives/sustainable-jobs/plan.html#s6
[lx] “Case Study: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” European Commission, May 2020, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-05/task_force_on_just_transition_for_canadian_coal_power_workers_and_communities_-_platform_for_coal_regions_in_transition_0.pdf
[lxi] Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.
[lxii] Ibid
[lxiii] Ibid
[lxiv] [lxiv] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf
[lxv] Ibid
[lxvi] Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.
[lxvii] Ibid
[lxviii] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf
[lxix] Brendan Frank & Sebastien Girard Lindsay, “Addressing Polarization: What Works? Case Study: The Just Transition Task Force,” Positive Energy, University of Ottawa (2020), https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/42487/1/Frank%20and%20Girard%20L%202020.pdf
[lxx] Ibid
[lxxi] “Sustainable Jobs Plan,” Government of Canada, May 25, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/training/initiatives/sustainable-jobs/plan.html#s6
[lxxii] “Still more questions than answers,” SaskToday, June 20, 2018, https://www.sasktoday.ca/south/opinion/still-more-questions-than-answers-4121647
[lxxiii] Konrad Gürtler, David L. Beer, & Jeremias Herberg, “Scaling just transitions: Legitimation strategies in coal phase-out commissions in Canada and Germany,” Political Geography, 88, (2021): 102406.; “Making Just Transition a defining mission,” Environment and Climate Change Scotland, September 15, 2021, https://www.gov.scot/news/making-just-transition-a-defining-mission/; “Task Force on Just Transition,” United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, accessed on October 31, 2023, https://unece.org/task-force-just-transition
[lxxiv] “A Just and Fair Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities: Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and Communities,” Environment and Climate Change Canada, December 2018, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-361-2019-eng.pdf
[lxxv] “About the fund,” Just Transition Participatory Budgeting Fund, accessed October 31, 2023, https://www.jtpbfund.scot/about