Problems and Purpose
The Indonesia – Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship was established to uncover the ‘conclusive truth’ about atrocities committed in Timor-Leste preceding and immediately following the Popular Consultation, a referendum conducted in 1999 for the Timorese to decide if they wanted independence from Indonesia or remain one of its provinces. The Commission was set up by the governments of the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, with a mandate to uncover the Conclusive Truth about the violence that occurred in East Timor prior to and immediately after the Popular Consultation. The Committee sat from August 2005 to May 2008, during which it reviewed the documentary outputs of other inquiries on the subject matter, held its own fact-finding, conducted comparative analysis of these inputs and issued a final report on the Human Rights Violations in 1999. The Commission of Truth and Friendship was a forum set-up by the two Governments, making it the first bilateral truth commission.
Background History and Context
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, or East Timor, occupies the eastern half of Timor Island in Southeast Asia while the Western half was Indonesian territory. The word, ‘Leste’ means East in Portuguese and East Timor was a colony of Portugal until 27 July 1975 when Portuguese Law No. 7/1975 provided for an election of a people’s assembly in 1976 which would then form a new government to whom Portugal was to hand over its authority in October 1978. The Timorese political parties that emerged in this period of transition either favoured independence (pro-independence) or autonomous integration with Indonesia (pro-autonomy/pro-integration). In January 1975, União Democrática Timorense (UDT), a party which desired independence through progressive autonomy under Portugal, broke away from an independence coalition it had with Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin), a party that advocated immediate independence. On 11 August, UDT collaborated with Portuguese Timor police commander to attack, arrest and detain Fretilin leaders, who retaliated with the help of the colonial army on 20 August. UDT members sought refuge in Indonesian territory, and were joined by other political parties, notably, Associação Popular Democrática de Timor (Apodeti), who desired an autonomous integration with the Republic of Indonesia, and other smaller parties like Klibur Oan Timor Assuain (KOTA) and the Partido Trabalhista (Labor Party). Fretilin on the other hand, took control of the territory in East Timor.
On 28 November 1975, Fretilin proclaimed a unilateral declaration of independence and on 30 November 1975, four political parties, UDT, Apodeti, KOTA, and Trabalhista, proclaimed their desire for integration of East Timor into Indonesia, known as the Balibo Declaration. Neither of these proclamations was recognized by Portugal, which still viewed itself as the administering authority of East Timor. Indonesia officially stated that it held no territorial ambitions over East Timor, but it recognized the Balibo Declaration as the valid declaration of the people’s will. On 17 December 1975 the “East Timor Provisional Government” (Pemerintah Sementara Timor Timur, PSTT) was formed consisting mostly of UDT and Apodeti organizers. On 17 July 1976, Indonesian President Suharto signed Law No. 7/1976 which officially declared East Timor as the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. From this date, the laws of Indonesia applied in East Timor. This was rejected by the United Nations which through the General Assembly Resolution No. 31/53 of 1 December 1976, rejected integration and called for the conduct of a referendum on the right to self-determination through internationally recognized means. Every year through 1981 the UN issued resolutions that affirmed the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination.
Indonesia was conscious of the fact that a resistance movement did not accept its presence, so it resorted to several approaches in governing East Timor. The first was a security approach through which the Indonesian military actively conducted military operations against the resistance movement. The second approach was welfare-based, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the East Timorese by intensifying development projects in several sectors, such as education and infrastructure. In May 1998 Indonesian President Suharto resigned in response to popular demonstrations and Vice-President Habibie became the President. This marked the beginning of Indonesia’s political transition from an authoritarian political state to a democratic one. Reforms was also extended to East Timor where the change of government of Indonesia allowed for open expressions for demands to hold a referendum and for independence. Groups that had previously operated underground opposing the presence of Indonesian government, began to conduct their activities openly. In June 1998, Indonesia offered East Timor widespread autonomy which would confer the region with the ability to organize itself while the Indonesian Government controlled finances, foreign policy and external defence. This offer was extensively debated by representatives of Indonesia, Portugal and the UN. On 27 January 1999, President Habibie decided that his government would consider the possibility for East Timor to be released from the Republic of Indonesia. In March 1999, tripartite talks between Portugal, Indonesia, and the United Nations led to an agreement to organize a public consultation in East Timor to determine whether widespread autonomy would be accepted or rejected.
On 5 May 1999, Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations reached an agreement about East Timor at the UN Headquarters in New York. Pursuant to the implementation of the 5 May Agreement, on 11 June 1999, the UN Security Council formed UNAMET through resolution No. 1246/1999. The mission and objectives of UNAMET were to organize and conduct the Popular Consultation that would determine whether the people of East Timor would accept or reject the constitutional offer of special autonomy for East Timor within the framework of the Unitary State of Indonesia. As a whole, planning, preparation and implementation of the Popular Consultation was done in 117 days from the 5 May Agreement to the Popular Consultation, which took place on 30 August 1999. On 4 September 1999, the UN Secretary General announced that 78.5 percent of the 450,000 voters refused the offer of widespread autonomy, clearly opening the door for East Timor’s independence. Following the results of the Popular Consultation, an alarming intensity of violence began.
On 11 August 2005, the Commission began to implement its mandate of uncovering the ‘conclusive truth’ about the violence of 1999 in East Timor. In conducting its work, it set out the following questions as its frame of analysis:
1. Were there gross human rights violations committed in East Timor in 1999?
2. What was the nature, causes, and scope of these violations in 1999? In other words, why did these human rights violations occur?
3. What were the most relevant contextual, or historical elements to understand these events in 1999?
4. What institutions are responsible for gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999?
5. What lessons can be learned from the answers to the above questions?
6. How can these lessons be best applied in the future to prevent human rights violations, as well as healing the wounds of the past and promoting friendship and reconciliation?
Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities
The Commission was jointly created and sponsored by the governments of the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Sittings were conducted in Bali with the support of the Government of Bali Province in Indonesia.
Participant Recruitment and Selection
The Commission’s process comprised three main stages, namely, (a) review of documents produced by earlier inquiries into the human rights violations in East Timor; (b) fact-finding sessions that involved human participants; and (c) production of a final report based on analysis and synthesis of the foregoing. The Document Review (first) stage was based on the output of four inquiries:
1. Commission of Inquiry (KPP HAM) appointed by the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM)
• KPP HAM Report
• KPP HAM Databases of documents and testimony
2. Trials by the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta
• Trial Documents and Final Judgments from the twelve East Timor Cases
• Investigation Dossiers (BAPs) of the Indonesian Attorney General’s Office for the twelve East Timor cases and documents attached to the BAP’s
3. Report of the Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste (CAVR)
• CAVR Final Report
• CAVR Community Profiles
4. Trials and investigations of the UN Special Panels for Serious Crimes and Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) in Dili
• Special Panels for Serious Crimes indictments and judgments for trials involving charges of crimes against humanity
• Serious Crimes Unit files, including the so-called “Wiranto Case File”
These documents had strengths, but the CTF also noted that each had weaknesses. For example, the KPP HAM and Ad Hoc Court Reports only focused on atrocities committed by pro-autonomy partisans who wanted to remain in Indonesia, but not those of the pro-independence groups who wanted to leave. Also, the non-judicial frameworks of the CAVR and KPP HAM inquiries limited the nature and scope of their investigations. And though the SCU and Ad Hoc Court were judicial, they were selective in choosing cases to probe. These shortcomings were analyzed alongside others and formed the main basis for its proposals on institutional reform.
The second stage of the Commission’s work was a Fact-Finding process, consisting of public and closed hearings, interviews, statement-taking, and written submissions. Due to the non-judicial framework of the CTF, the hearings at its fact finding (second) stage were designed to permit the presentation of perspectives without interruption after which clarifications could be sought by the Commissioners. Through hearings, a wide variety of perspectives on the violence in 1999 were presented to the Commission. The testimonies provided came from witnesses who experienced the events in different roles, and to accommodate those reluctant or afraid of bearing public witness, the Commission devised a system of closed hearings. However, the United Nations did not permit its staff to testify. Independent of the Document Review stage, the CTF had identified 14 cases it would prioritize as characteristic of the events in 1999. It subsequently created outlines for analyzing these cases, comprising a chronology and key details. The outlines were used as frameworks for reconstructing the priority cases through the hearings of the Fact-Finding process. The process of reconstruction involved taking evidence from victims, witnesses, and alleged perpetrators in the cases, as well as those with specialized knowledge such as subject matter experts and context speakers.
Methods and Tools Used
The Committee of Truth and Friendship employed a variety of methods across its Document Review and Fact-Finding stages to determine whether human rights violations that could be categorized as crimes against humanity took place in East Timor in 1999, and to determine what institutions were responsible for the violations that occurred
Document Review Methodologies
In the Document Review stage, the CTF reviewed the documents from the selected four inquiries in two ways. First, it reviewed the documents itself. Second, it obtained the assistance of an independent set of experts supervised by the Commission’s Expert Advisor. Each of the four bodies of documents was evaluated through the following questions:
1. What conclusions do they each reach regarding the occurrence of gross human rights violations or crimes against humanity in East Timor in 1999?
2. What conclusions do they each reach regarding institutional responsibility for those crimes?
3. Are those conclusions supported by the evidence they had available to them?
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of the four bodies of documents?
5. What are the common conclusions regarding gross human rights violations and institutional responsibility that were reached on the basis of the evidence contained in these four bodies of documents?
In line with its mandate of establishing whether gross human rights violations had occurred and identifying institutional culpability for such crimes against humanity, the CTF adopted an analytical framework that defined gross human right violations as situations exhibiting; (a) the occurrence of an attack against a civilian population, (b) the targeting of such attack against civilian and not armed persons, (c) the targeting of such attack against a civilian population and not just isolated or a few civilians, and (d) a widespread or systematic character.
To establish institutional responsibility, the Commission based its analysis of the four bodies of documents on political, moral and ethical factors, rather than a legal doctrine. Hence, it adopted an analytical framework that sought to identify institutions that ought to bear responsibility for the violence perpetrated from political and moral perspectives. Two questions guided this aspect of the investigation, namely:
1. At the operational level at which the crimes against humanity were actually perpetrated, does the evidence indicate patterns of coordinated activity over time and in multiple locations?
2. Do those patterns of coordinated activity reveal which institutions participated in enabling those activities to occur? That participation can take two forms: (a) institutions whose members or personnel participated directly in perpetration of these crimes; (b) institutions that provided regular and substantial support, organization, resources, direction, training, or planning for the perpetrators of these crimes.
Both questions had to be answered affirmatively to establish institutional responsibility, but an inherent limitation was that some documents focused more on individual than on institutional responsibility. Hence, the main method adopted was to identify and evaluate conclusions that focused on institutional responsibility and where no such direct conclusions were made, focus was given to analyzing the evidence in the documents to see if any conclusions could be made regarding institutional responsibility.
Fact-Finding Methodologies
During the Fact-Finding stage, the Commission employed several methodologies, including statement taking, interviews, public hearings, closed hearings, and written submissions.
Statement Taking/Interviews – The CTF designed this process to obtain information from parties relevant to the 14 priority cases, making a crucial counterpart to the documentary research done on them. As such, the Commission aimed to get at least 3 statements for each case – one each from a victim, a witness and an alleged perpetrator. The operating principle was to give equal opportunity to connected parties to clarify existing facts obtained from research of the cases.
Hearings - The Commission held six Public Hearings and eight Closed Hearings, conducted in Dili, Jakarta, and Denpasar. Connected parties who opted to participate in Public Hearings were requested to prepare certain presentation materials. After presentations, clarification was sought solely by the Commissioners through questions and answers. Closed hearings were also conducted based on considerations such as requests from the parties, political and security considerations, and the judgement of the CTF.
Submissions – The CTF invited submissions from parties who did not participate through the Statement Taking or Hearing methods. Submissions were either voluntary or requested by the Commission. The Commission received three submissions from the twenty parties it made requests to, namely, Komnas Perempuan Indonesia, Forum Rektor and the Center for Internal Displacement Services-CIS Kupang. Nine voluntary submissions were received, bringing the total in this category Fact-Finding to twelve.
The Commission analyzed the information it received in the fact-finding process to uncover whether gross human rights violations occurred. This analysis was guided by the two questions:
1. Was there an attack directed against a civilian population?
2. Was the alleged gross human rights violation part of a widespread and/or systematic attack against a civilian population?
It also sought to establish whether there was institutional responsibility for those crimes by asking the questions:
1. At the operational level at which the crimes against humanity were actually perpetrated, can we identify patterns of coordinated activity over time and in multiple locations?
2. Do those patterns of coordinated activity reveal which institutions participated in enabling those activities to occur?
Given the non-judicial framework of the CTF, testimony from participants in the fact-finding methods were neither bound by the rules of evidence nor scrutinized to determine the origin or nature of the information shared. Consequently, the Fact-Finding process subjected the testimony it received to a careful scrutiny that considered the following factors:
1. The nature of the statement itself – to determine if it reported facts, an opinion, or an interpretation, and whether it was a general or specific allegation about individual, discrete and specific events.
2. Where the statement expressed an opinion or interpretation, the Commission sought to establish its factual basis.
3. Where the statement purported to report facts, the CTF sought to determine the source of the factual content.
4. Where the statement asserted to be based on direct experience or observation of an eyewitness, information to prove participation was looked for.
5. Whether the statement contained specific factual details supporting the claim that the person actually witnessed or participated in the event.
6. Where the testimony given by the participating witness was received from an informant, to determine the basis on which it was provided and if it was credible.
7. To determine whether the testimony may have been influenced by extraneous factors such as interests, threats, rewards, or incentives.
8. Whether the statements made by an individual on one occasion were consistent with those made on other occasions.
9. Whether the statements made by an individual are contradicted by the statements of others who participated in the fact-finding process.
What Went On: Process, Interaction, and Participation
The Commission of Truth and Friendship conducted a comparative analysis to evaluate and synthesize the results of the Document Review and Fact-Finding processes. As it weighed the evidence and conclusions from these stages, the CTF sought to determine whether gross human rights violations occurred in East Timor in 1999 and whether there was institutional responsibility for such violations. It adopted a conceptual framework that addressed whether there was an attack against a civilian population and, if so, whether that attack was widespread or systematic. Where it established that such attacks existed and involved acts such as murder, persecution, rape, deportation, or other kinds of inhumane treatment, then it concluded that human rights violations had occurred.
From its comparative analysis, the Commission reported that it was fairly easy to establish the occurrence of human rights violations in East Timor in 1999 because of a significant correspondence of the evidence from the Document Review and Fact-Finding processes. Based on evidence from the four bodies of documents, as well as testimony provided by statement taking and hearing processes, the Commission identified specific incidents of attacks against civilian populations as examples that were representative of the wider phenomena. These attacks included acts of murder, torture, rape, deportation/forcible transfer, and destruction of property. Some specific incidents analyzed were the attack on the Liquiça Church (Liquiça district), the attack on Suai Church (Covalima district), the attack on the Carrascalão house, the attacks on the Dili Diocese and Bishop Belo’s house (all Dili district), the attack on clergy in Lospalos (Lautém district), the killings at Passabe (Oecussi district), and illegal detentions carried out by all sides to the conflict.
Moreover, the CTF determined that attacks against civilian populations were geographically widespread. This determination was based on the Commission’s consideration of credible reports of human rights violations from every district in East Timor in 1999, and from multiple sub-districts within each district. For example, it reviewed confirmed reports of human rights violations from every sub-district of Bobonaro, Covalima, Liquiça and Ermera districts. In addition to this spatial analysis, the Commission determined that human rights violations were evident on a temporal basis because reviewed evidence indicating its occurrence in every month of 1999 relevant to its mandate with obvious peaks in April and immediately following the announcement of the results of the Popular Consultation.
However, the Commission found it more complex to address the question of institutional responsibility. The primary concern was whether gross human rights violations were committed in a patterned, organized, and systematic manner that sufficiently linked them to particular institutions so as to firmly root any findings of institutional responsibility. The final report described several key factors relevant to findings of institutional responsibility and summarized below as follows:
Organized Provision of Weapons – The evidence analyzed by the Commission in the Document Review process, as well as the testimony given by witnesses in the Fact-Finding process, enabled the CTF to reach clear findings regarding the provision of weapons. During Hearings, the Commission was informed by no less than five different militia groups’ leaders from different geographic areas that either they were personally supplied with weapons by the Indonesian Military (TNI). Although, other witnesses, including those who served as active, high ranking, TNI officers and paramilitary commanders in East Timor in 1999, argued that weapons were not given to the militias by the TNI, the Commission came to the conclusion that both the Fact-Finding process and Document Review gave clear and conclusive evidence that weapons were controlled and supplied to militias in a highly organized and systematic manner in 1999 by the TNI in East Timor.
Funding – The militias relied on a large amount of funding and other material support to carry out their activities across the region and this necessitated precise, brisk, and planned disbursements. In the Document Review and Fact-Finding processes, the Commission carefully considered how institutions supplied the material means by which gross human rights violations were perpetrated in East Timor in 1999 by militias and other groups. During public hearings for instance, the CTF heard claims from militia commanders that they received funding and other forms of material support via the Civil Security System known as Pamswakarsa and there was debate over whether Pamswakarsa was synonymous with Aitarak, a known militia group, because it was claimed that some persons belonged to both groups. Other testimony from the Document Review corroborated evidence supporting a finding of highly organized funding support for militias. Whereas statements were made to the Commission claiming that no funding was explicitly provided to pro-autonomy militias, the evidence for such claims lacked comparable depth or credibility, leading the CTF to conclude that pro-autonomy militias received funding and material support as an integral part of a highly organized and continuous cooperative relationship in the pursuit of common political goals aimed at intimidating or preventing civilians from supporting the pro-independence movement.
Systematic Targeting of Pro-Independence Supporters – Beyond the provision of weapons and funding, the CTF assessed the systematic and organized manner in which militias perpetrated gross human rights violations against civilians, and the ways Indonesian institutions were linked to or involved in the perpetration of such crimes. During Document Review, detailed and credible examples of gross human rights violations were provided and were also described by witnesses in the Fact-Finding process. Some other witnesses alleged that violence against civilians was not carried out in a planned or systematic manner, or with the support or participation of Indonesian institutions. In a testimony given by Marcus Baquin from Oecussi District, the Commission learned that a Sakunar militia commander, Gabriel Kolo, his group of militia men, and Anton Sabraka from the TNI, attacked his village and two others in the area on September 8, 1999, killed 18 people in the raid, destroyed the village and forcibly transported male survivors to West Timor on September 9. Early the next day, 74 men selected from the refugees taken to West Timor were taken to back to East Timor near the border and attacked with machetes and guns under the supervision and with the active participation of Gabriel Kolo and Anton Sabraka. Most died. The Commission noted in its report that Marcus Baquin still bore the physical scar of a machete cut to the head which he survived because they assumed he was dead. From this testimony and others, including statements given by a former militia man, the CTF found that militia attacks against pro-independence groups were systematic, highly organized, and conducted with the support of the TNI and police personnel.
Violations Committed by Pro-independence Groups – Although the greater focus of earlier investigations highlighted the actions of pro-autonomy groups, the Document Review and Fact-Finding processes provided information about human rights violations committed by pro-independence groups. However, it also reported that the scope and quantity of these violations did not compare to those of the pro-autonomy groups. The Commission recognized claims of self-defence raised by some participants in the conflict but stressed that such claims could not justify gross violations of human rights. The de-prioritization of pro-independence violations in earlier investigations placed a limitation on the information that could be obtained from the Document Review. Several allegations were made against pro-independence groups during the Fact-Finding phase and while consistent with information obtained from Document Review, it was not detailed or substantive enough to make up for the weaknesses. The CTF therefore established that a significant number of violent acts were committed by pro-independence groups against pro-autonomy groups and their supporters in East Timor in 1999. However, it could not clearly establish institutional responsibility in terms of support, coordination, planning or systematization as in the case of the pro-autonomy groups.
Influence, Outcomes, and Effects
The Commission of Truth and Friendship concluded that gross human rights violations in the form of crimes against humanity occurred in East Timor in 1999. These crimes against humanity occurred as part of a widespread and systematic attack on civilian populations that included: (1) murder; (2) deportation or forced displacement of civilian populations; (3) illegal detention in the form of severe deprivation of physical liberty; (4) rape and other forms of sexual violence (5) forced disappearance; and (6) other inhumane acts, such as destruction and burning of property. Having established that these acts of violence were “directed against” civilians, the Commission also established that the incidents were not isolated, but widespread and systematic in scope and character, and occurred repeatedly in a number of places over a period of time. The Commission arrived at its conclusions based on extensive scrutiny and analysis of a large volume of documentary and testimonial evidence. These sources were evaluated to determine their authenticity, depth, relevance and factual merit. During this process, victims, perpetrators, witnesses, the authorities of government institutions and expert advisors were all consulted, with supporters of the two political persuasions, that is, pro-autonomy and pro-independence, given the opportunity to share their perspectives. The CTF determined that the majority of human rights violations were committed by pro-autonomy militia groups, but pro-independence groups equally committed gross human rights violations, albeit to a lesser degree.
The Commission also concluded that institutional responsibility could be assigned for the human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. It defined institutional responsibility as participation or acquiescence by state institutions in criminal or unlawful conduct and noted the institutions must accept responsibility for the actions of their members. The basis on which the CTF found institutional responsibility, was its analysis of documents reviewed and testimonies received. The Commission concluded from the evidence that pro-autonomy militias were the primary direct perpetrators of gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999 and that the consistency, pattern, and systematic nature of the crimes met the requirements for institutional responsibility. In particular, the Commission found that TNI personnel, police, and civilian authorities cooperated with and supported these militias in significant ways to perpetrate human right violations. This responsibility included direct and indirect participation in the form of funding, supply, distribution and use of weapons, as well as co-perpetration. The Commission therefore recommended that the Government of Indonesia bear state responsibility for the gross human rights violations committed by pro-autonomy militias with the support and/or participation of Indonesian institutions or their members. On the one hand, the CTF reported there was no doubt that human rights violations were committed against civilian populations who opposed independence, but that it could not ascertain the number of violations committed by pro-independence groups or assign institutional responsibility for such human rights violations with any certainty. From a forward-looking perspective, the Commission recommended that the government of Timor-Leste acknowledge state responsibility for the gross human rights violations perpetrated by pro-independence groups.
Analysis and Lessons Learned
Based on the lessons learned in the course of its work, the Commission of Truth and Friendship proffered forward-looking recommendations for institutional reform and other measures that could prevent a recurrence of the human rights violations, heal old wounds, and promote reconciliation and true friendship. Consequently, the recommendations were not based on retributive, but restorative justice, which stresses the needs of the victims, and seeks to reintegrate all parties into an inclusive society. The Commission reported that two underlying principles were used in formulating its recommendations, namely:
1. The recommendations must be forward looking, inclusive, and must not discriminate between parties, particularly based on political affiliation. And,
2. The recommendations would take the form of collective and not individual reparations
The Commission identified weak rule of law, a lack of judicial accountability, and the absence of political mechanisms for resolving differences peacefully as factors that permitted the occurrence of human rights violations. Thus, some of the recommendations identified reform of state institutions like civilian authorities, the military and the police to prevent future human rights violations. Noting the importance of making recommendations that are realistic and implementable, the CTF’s proposals were split into two categories:
1. Short Term and Urgent
2. Long Term and Aspirational
Given its bilateral mandate, most of the Commission’s recommendations did not isolate either country but provided for both nations to learn from the past and take preventative actions. The specific recommendations are as follows:
Short Term and Urgent
1. Accountability and Institutional Reform - A key component of institutional reforms is promoting a culture of accountability in the institutions whose responsibility it is to maintain peace and security and to prevent and punish violations of law and human rights.
a. Amnesty – although its terms of reference provided that the Commission may recommend amnesty under certain conditions, it found that amnesty would not be in accordance with its goals of restoring human dignity, creating the foundation for reconciliation between the two countries, and ensuring the non-recurrence of violence within a framework guaranteed by the rule of law. Therefore, the CTF did not make any recommendations for amnesty.
b. Rehabilitation - the Commission considered rehabilitation to consists of actions meant to restore the good name of those unjustly accused of human rights violations. It therefore needed to be able to prove that an alleged perpetrator was unjustly accused. The Commission determined they were not given the instruments to conduct research on individual cases of accusations of individuals. Therefore, it made no recommendations for rehabilitation.
c. Institutional Reforms and Capacity Building – the CTF recommended:
i. Developing a human rights training program focused specifically on the role of security forces and intelligence organizations in situations of political conflict, mass demonstrations and civil unrest.
ii. Developing a human rights trainings program focused specifically on the role of particular civil institutions such as the Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Defense, in planning for and working to prevent situations of civil and political conflict.
iii. Promoting institutional reforms which would enhance the authority and effectiveness of institutions or agencies charged with the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations alleged to have been perpetrated by members of the armed forces, police or other security agencies.
iv. Creating specialized training programs for military, police, and civilian officials to promote the protection of women and children and the prevention of sexual exploitation and violence in all forms against women, and other vulnerable populations. Further recommendations included the development of specialized investigative and enforcement mechanisms within the police and Attorney General’s Office for gender crimes committed in the context of conflict, civil unrest or political disturbance.
v. That both States develop and implement a program to complete security sector reform in the transformation of military doctrine and institutional practices and mentalities from freedom fighting or revolutionary army to professional armed forces appropriate for a modern, democratic states operating under the rule of law.
2. Joint Border and Security Policy – Reporting that unresolved border and security issues represented an ongoing impediment to achieving peace and friendship between the two nations and to addressing the needs of those individuals whose lives have been adversely affected by the violence in 1999. The Commission thus recommended that:
a. The governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste establish visa-free “Peace Zones,” already informally in existence, on the border between Timor-Leste and West Timor.
b. Increased security be set-up on the border zone between the two countries through a mechanism of field cooperation, coordination and training involving joint patrols and joint border posts.
c. The agreements related to land, sea and air border demarcation and delimitation between the two countries that have not yet been fully agreed be completed.
d. Special programs be developed to implement and enforce standards of professional and technical expertise and qualifications of border security personnel.
e. A process be developed to enable “safe crossing” for Indonesians citizens of Timor Leste descent, and Timorese citizens of Indonesian descent, seeking to return either temporarily or permanently to Timor-Leste or Indonesia.
3. Documentation and Conflict Resolution Center – the Commission identified the need to establish a Documentation and Conflict Resolution Center (DCRC) that would be tasked with developing and implementing educational and training programs in conflict resolution and promoting understanding of the common history of the two nations. The Commission therefore recommended that:
a. Relevant government ministries consult to establishment of a Documentation and Conflict Resolution Resource Center (DCRC) to be located in Dili, Timor Leste, with a partner Center in Jakarta.
b. The collection of documents housed in the Center be appropriately secured because of the confidential information and testimony they contain, and that both two countries take all necessary steps to guarantee non-disclosure of the identity of confidential or protected witnesses.
c. Acting through the DCRC, the two governments encourage and promote cooperative historical research between the two countries with the aim of promoting a common understanding of their shared history.
d. Acting through the DCRC, the two governments would develop effective programs aimed at identifying, preventing and resolving social and political conflict.
4. Economic and Asset Issues - to promote friendship, reconciliation and to meet the needs of those affected by the violence, the Commission strongly recommended that the two governments accelerate the resolution of the complex economic and asset issues resulting from the 1999 conflict. It recommended that the two governments each take responsibility for resolving the private asset claims asserted by its citizens on a priority basis.
5. Commission for Disappeared Persons – the Commission recommended that the governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste work together to acquire information about the fate of disappeared people and cooperate to gather data and provide information to their families. It also recommended the continuation of programs previously undertaken to ensure protection of displaced children’s rights.
Long Term and Aspirational
The Commission recommended the following areas be pursued as part of a long-term strategy by both nations to foster reconciliation and friendship.
1. Promote cultural and educational exchanges including border activities, scholarships and teacher and scholar exchanges at all levels.
2. Promote cooperation and support in the health sector, including education programs for medical personnel, public health research and assessment, and the mutual provision of hospital facilities and joint services, as well as accepting inter-hospital referrals.
3. Promote a wider culture of legal and human rights awareness among the people as a whole, including human rights material in the general education curriculum of both countries.
4. Continue bilateral cooperation in respecting and caring for the remains of the deceased in each country, including the cemetery of Indonesian military personnel fallen in Timor Leste.
5. Consider allowing a dual citizenship option for those children born of mixed national heritage.
The breadth of recommendations reflected the complexity of the challenges faced by Timor-Leste and Indonesia as they worked through the past and looked to a peaceful and prosperous future. Hence, the Commission suggested multiple steps it considered necessary to overcome the challenges. These were:
1. A joint acknowledgement of the responsibility by the Presidents of both nations and an apology to the peoples, especially the victims of violence
2. Systematic dissemination of the Commission’s report to people of the two nations as an important part of the healing process, and
3. The creation of implementation mechanisms to effectively design, oversee, undertake and evaluate each of the recommendations.
The Commission noted that its recommendations and spirit of truth were a sound basis to further develop ties between Indonesia and Timor Leste. Symbolically and through the tangible results of its work, the two countries joined together to face a difficult past and commit to a positive approach to the future.
See Also
Participedia. "Global Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Collection." Accessed May 22, 2024. Global Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Collection – Participedia
References
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Hirst, Megan. “An Unfinished Truth: An Analysis of the Commission of Truth and Friendship's Final Report on the 1999 Atrocities in East Timor.” International Center for Transitional Justice, March 2009. ICTJ-TimorLeste-Unfinished-Truth-2009-English.pdf
Ibhawoh, Bonny, Sylvia Bawa and Jasper Abembia Ayelazuno. "Truth Commissions and the Politics of State Building." In Truth Commissions and State Building edited by Bonny Ibhawoh, Jasper Abembia Ayelazuno and Sylvia Bawa, 3-32. Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2023.
Perry, Robin. “The Commission of Truth and Friendship and Justice for East Timor.” Alternative Law Journal 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 199-200. The Commission of Truth and Friendship and Justice of East Timor | Alternative Law Journal (informit.org)
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Terms of Reference for The Commission of Truth and Friendship Established by The Republic of Indonesia and The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. August 2006. CTF-RI-TL - Term Of Reference.pdf (usip.org)
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