Problems and Purpose

A key concern for the metropolitan region of Santiago de Chile in 2010 was water scarcity and water abundance. Worsening glacier melting alongside total rainfall reduction has led to water shortages in the region.[1] Therefore, the region was susceptible to flooding, especially in high-risk urban areas, due to planning deficiencies.[2] [3] While Santiago is one of the most advanced cities of Latin America, the impact climate change has is not equally felt within the city. [4] Public-sector responses to climate impacts first emerged in 2006 and 2008. However, it wasn't until 2010 that the CAS project was initiated. The purpose of the participatory process was to make the case concerning “climate change adaptation planning, communicate scientific data efficiently, be clear about methodologies and uncertainties, and ensure integrated, coordinated responses rather than sectoral fragmentation.” [5] Therefore, the project sought to explore the principal climatic changes anticipated in the MRS, the consequences of the changes, the risks and vulnerabilities of the regions' inhabitants, and whether these are due to climate change.

Background History and Context

Chile is a country of varying climates, from the northern drylands to icy southern Patagonia.[6] While enjoying a Mediterranean climate, the capital city of Santiago has been subject to droughts since 1541. At the time of CAS, the past 30 years have shown trends in temperature rise as well as varying water issues, with areas either having too much water, resulting in flooding (e.g., urban areas), or too little, resulting in droughts.[7] This highlighted the need for planning regulations within the region, due to disproportionate effects throughout the area. Wealthy residents in the areas of Providencia and Las Condes in the barrio-alto (higher up the Cordillera de los Andes) enjoyed prosperous water consumption of around 805 litres of water per day, whilst the poorer areas of the city (e.g., Pedro Aguirre Cerda) consume as little as 180 litres per day. [8] This highlights how the poorer areas suffer disproportionately from varying water supply whereas the more affluent and prosperous parts of the region, underlining the socio-spatial effects throughout MRS and why such an initiative was essential.

Public sector responses emerged in 2006 through a climate change strategy and later a climate action plan was implemented in 2008, however, it wasn't until 2010 that the climate adaptation project (CAS) was created. The collaborative governance approach undertaken in Santiago de Chile was part of a larger trans- and interdisciplinary project.[9] The participatory process included in this project was the first of its kind regarding climate change in Chile, as planning and governance schemes in Chile tend to be sectoral and non-participatory. Therefore, as collaborative governance is considered increasingly important for climate change adaptation, climate change is viewed as a cross-boundary issue, so CAS needed to involve a participatory process. [10] [11]

Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities

The aforementioned participatory process was part of a larger project that obtained international funding from the German Ministry of the Environment (Ministry of the Environment of the State of Saxony-Anhalt).[12] The project's funding was chosen by researchers in German and Chilean universities who previously collaborated on urban research. [13] Seizing an opportunity to extend their collaboration to the developing climate risks in the city, the researchers proposed the initiative to Santiago’s Regional Government, gaining sufficient funding for the project from the German Ministry of Environment.[14] However, the research team drove the initiative with longstanding expertise and interest in Santiago's urban development.

The regional government leader, ‘the Indente’, endorsed the initiative, granting coordination responsibilities to academics from the Pontificia Universidad Catòlica.[15] This project coordination team – who were in charge of organising the roundtables with the key regional partners (GORE and SEREMI MA) – was created to choose the individuals who would partake. This coordination team was called the Helmholtz-Centre for Environmental Research. Individuals included public and private sector organisations with sectoral or spatial influence, alongside civil society organisations involved in issues related to participatory governance and those which roundtable participants suggested as relevant actors.[16] It was essential to this process that a wide range of actors was included to obtain various interests. This is a highly different procedure for policy formation in Chile, with normally only public sector authorities being involved.

Participant Recruitment and Selection

To recruit participants, the project coordination team identified two critical stakeholders from MRS (CORE and SEREMI MA) to join the participatory process due to their essential role in developing a Regional Climate Change Adaptation Plan.[17] While the regional government of the MRS is usually the primary institution for policymaking in the region, the coordination team selected around 30 organisations to participate in this process, including universities, government ministries, the water regulator, and five civil society organisations.[18] The participatory approach was meant to increase transparency and achieve more effective planning. However, when it came to the people being 'planned for' (e.g. the most vulnerable in the city to climate impacts), the coordination team highlighted numerous challenges with their inclusion:

1. Coordinators' insufficient knowledge of their locations.
2. The sheer number of them.
3. The fragmented nature of the city into 52 municipalities.
4. The variegated formal and informal nature of neighbourhood organisations. [19] 

Therefore, the coordinators decided that public-sector agencies and civil society organisations could proxy for the urban poor. [20] However, this highlights how the participatory process was exclusive to the elite few and causes a lack of representation which will be discussed in the Influence, Outcomes, and Effects Section.

Methods and Tools Used

The participatory process was organised in a series of ten roundtable meetings over 2.5 years. The roundtable meetings included numerous regularly attending participants (12-15 people per meeting) alongside additional participants who were invited to discuss relevant issues. Therefore, the coordination team maintained a core group of key actors during the process, with the additional flexibility of adding other members. The collaborative governance process had a solid institutional background and a high level of legitimacy due to the participation of GORE and SEREMI MA. [21] This encouraged high levels of participation in meetings. This process was different from other processes by which scientific reports are generated and passed over to policymakers to implement, with minimal follow-up.[22] 

A range of tools were applied to facilitate discussion during the process, including discussion papers produced by scientists on several issues associated with climate impacts. These papers created a knowledge base so that less informed participants could engage in the discussions at the roundtable meetings. All information derived from roundtable meetings and discussions were systemised and released to participants in roundtable minutes.[23] The minutes helped form the basis of discussions for the preceding roundtable meetings. Lastly, coordinators used a tool called ‘making the case’ which involves “convincing the participants of the urgency, validity and finality of the process, as well as the importance of their support within this process”, so that they feel like their voice has a genuine impact on climate adaptation measures.[24]

Roundtable meetings generally follow a relatively strict protocol that enables a more practical discussion with a group of elite actors alongside the advantage of being reasonably cheap to fund. However, these advantages also can be viewed as disadvantages, as the small number of participants involved in a round table process leaves the question of representation. This method dictates that those outside of the roundtable process should accept the decisions made by a select few.[25] In the case of CAS, those who were excluded were the urban poor who were affected the most by climate change. This was problematic as those affected by the problem could not express their views and were forced to accept ideas from those who may not have experienced the issues to the same extent.

What Went On: Process, Interaction, and Participation

Each roundtable meeting consisted of several thematic scientific presentations at the beginning, followed by a participatory activity where stakeholders could reflect on their knowledge and experiences. The structure of this process was to "strike a balance between socialising scientific results and engendering reflections of the practical implications of these results" while also looking for possible adaptive measures. [26] In the time between roundtable meetings, stakeholders were given thematic briefing papers relating to issues and concepts discussed, in order to encourage a common framework of understanding. Therefore, participants were involved in a continual learning process—allowing them to review and reflect on relevant information in between sessions proved to be an effective mechanism for maintaining interest and participation.[27]

Discussions surrounded the critical topics of energy, water, land use, and their attendant vulnerabilities. Many participants had good ideas and strong opinions on climate adaptation measures. However, although the process appeared to be participatory, the policymakers ignored many of the participants' 'good ideas' presented at the implementation stage. [28] Therefore, despite coordinators' best efforts to be fair and progressive as facilitators, they inadvertently filtered out reforms that ultimately could have confronted aspects of urban prejudice by challenging the political-economic status quo.[29]

Influence, Outcomes, and Effects

Unfortunately, a year after the plan was created and returned to the regional government, the body created to institutionalise adaptation in regional politics (subcommittee for climate change) was on its last legs. The Regional Councillor who presided over the subcommittee lost political office from not receiving enough votes. The sub-committee that was regarded as a significant sign of political support was dissolved. This led to competing for political priorities. Despite the efforts of all involved, the plan failed to be ratified by the political authorities and was not implemented by national ministries. [30]

Aguas Andinas and The Pontificia Universidad Católica were the real winners in maintaining the status quo in terms of pay-off. The Pontificia Universidad Católica's researchers produced a plan with practical measures that theoretically involved a wide range of participants, while Aguas Andinas were able to carry on business as usual. [31] The public-sector officials had gained support throughout the process but failed in securing long-term support for adaptation.

Understanding how successful the CAS project was first requires reaffirming the main goal for the roundtable participatory process. Essentially the main aim was to forge an interface between the science and policy fields and achieve a robust and mixed approach to climate change adaptation policy for the MRS.[32] The process resulted in a high degree of legitimacy among important actors in the public sector as standards could be refined and concerns minimised by opening up the potential fields of conflict or disagreement within a defined process.[33] While the plan did not go much further than the process itself, as aforementioned, the project was crucial in highlighting the issues climate change was causing in the MRS and, therefore, the project can be said to have met its aims.

While the project was mainly considered a success, it was questionable whether its outcomes, influences and effects can be regarded as fully democratic. While there is no definitive way of assessing democratic institutions, Smith (2009) provides a framework.[34] Smith (2009) acknowledges that while this is by no means a final set of goods, it is essential to assess CAS against six interests: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgment, transparency, efficiency, and transferability.[35]

The first good is 'inclusiveness.' This considers who has the right to participate. While the CAS process was more inclusive than previous projects, it still excluded poorer MRS members who were more impacted by climate change than others. Difference theorists continually stress how presence can significantly impact decisions: if the politically excluded are not present, decisions are unlikely to respond to their concerns fully.[36] This was the case with CAS, with public-sector agencies and civil society organisations used as proxies for the urban poor.[37] However, it must be considered that there were several challenges that the project faced (mentioned in the Participant Recruitment and Selection section) which meant that the inclusion of these groups of people wouldn't have been practical to the aims of the project.

'Popular control' concentrates on which participants were included in the stages of problem definition, options analysis, option selection, and implementation. CAS did not meet all these requirements; it especially did not meet it at the implementation stage. While a favourable outcome of the process was the early formation of a group of public-sector officials who found common cause in advancing climate adaptation on the political agenda, others competing for influence achieved little in reaching their objectives. Most participants and the public had objections towards Aguas Andinas–a water services company–due to the recurring crises in the water supply. Despite this, the CAS project's regulator enjoyed good relations with Aguas Andinas. Therefore, civil society organisations began by criticising regulators for corruption and irresponsibility, especially when participants tried to push reforms to the 1981 water code; CAS coordinators took measures to prevent these proposals because they were minority views or too contentious.[38] Participants felt let down by what was sold as a collaborative and democratic process. They began questioning the legitimacy of the planning process and its probability of achieving change.[39] Additionally, in the closing phase of the process, experts filtered out essential measures recommended by participants. Therefore, while coordinators argued that they attempted to make the process as participatory as possible, the proposed final plan was not reflective of this.

When measuring the process' outcomes up against inclusiveness and popular control, CAS does not seem to live up to the expectations of a democratic institution. However, when one looks at the other democratic goods (considered judgment, transparency, efficiency, and transferability), one begins to see the more positive democratic aspects of this process. Considered judgment was utilised throughout the process, with participants given time to reflect on the process and scientific thematic presentations in the months between roundtable meetings. The process was designed to balance “socialising scientific results and engendering reflections on the practical implications of these results and possible adaptive responses.” [40] Therefore, the democratic good of considered judgment appeared to be well accounted for in this process.

As transparency is a vital component of successful participatory processes, it is worth discussing how CAS ensured this was accounted for. [41] Firstly, coordinators provided information derived from discussions and participatory activities that were systematised and sent out to participants in roundtable minutes after each meeting.[42] Information collected from one participatory action served as input for activities at the following roundtable. Additionally, discussion papers were produced by the scientists involved in several issues associated with climate change adaptation alongside a summary of their key findings on climate change and the impacts on MRS.[43] The transparency of these documents allowed for a joint knowledge base for participants in the round table meetings. The documents helped participants understand climate change and its impact, allowing them to contribute to discussions on the planning process.

When looking at the efficiency of the process, theorists and practitioners are often quick to stress the virtues and benefits of involvement for participants and sponsoring institutions; however, it's essential to consider the demands they place on citizens and other institutions and “whether these are worth bearing individually and socially.” [44] Firstly, the 2.5-year project was strenuous on participants, and the fact that not much came of the proposal suggests that individual’s time was taken for granted. However, the project was efficient in terms of funding, with the process being funded by the German Ministry of the Environment. Maintaining a participatory process like CAS involves funding, as the work of several international research teams and constant coordination over three years (including time for scientific research and the entire roundtable process) comes at a considerable external expense.[45] Therefore, this process was relatively efficient due to the project's external funding. However, attempting to fund a similar task using a similar approach would be challenging without outside help.

The last democratic good to weigh CAS against is transferability: is this project able to transfer to different contexts and populations? Firstly, the project was reused and copied in several new projects regarding climate change on different levels in Chile after its demise in 2010. This suggests that it is a success when this method is attached to democratic processes to do with climate change. Therefore, collaborative governance for climate change adaptation is a social learning process that can be extended by overcoming the gap between the limitations of science (long-term projections) against short-term political objectives and sectoral perspectives.[46] However, as previously mentioned, this project would be hard to carry out without external funding, meaning that a country that would struggle to fund this project may not find the method as effective as it was in Santiago de Chile.

From assessing CAS against the democratic goods recommended by Smith (2009), overall, the CAS project was a success, and its outcomes of a participatory approach to climate change adaptation met the aims required of it. [47] Despite this, however, the project was lacking in the areas of inclusiveness and popular control. Although the project did not meet all the criteria required of a democratic project, Smith (2009) acknowledges that it is not unusual for a participatory process not to meet all requirements.[48] This does not mean it was an unsuccessful project, as the roundtable process was a means of building social capital among stakeholders as their knowledge in climate change adaptation increased. [49]

Analysis and Lessons Learned

It is important to note the challenges and lessons in this process in order to understand how successful the project was in achieving its aims. Therefore, this section will explain these and give ideas on how to improve on a participatory process like CAS. As with any participatory process, the CAS project faced many challenges, especially when dealing with an issue as complex as climate change adaptation. The first challenge the process faced was gauging how to maintain the interest and commitment of the involved stakeholders.[50] As the operation took place when knowledge about climate change adaptation was restricted mainly to academic circles, little was known about it.[51] [52] Therefore, it was fundamental to have a group of committed stakeholders regularly attend meetings to achieve a legitimated, cohesive and inter-sectoral set of measures, as stakeholder involvement in climate change adaptation is complex.[53] [54] The process of "making the case" appeared to work well for CAS, as the group of stakeholders chosen participated throughout the 2.5 years.

The next challenge was translating scientific information to the participants who had no prior knowledge of climate change adaptation. Translation helped make the process more transparent for individuals to understand what was going on and how this information could be transformed into the policy.[55] The information should be translated in such a way that participants understand the urgency of their participation. The long-term horizon was addressed by focusing on potential climate change scenarios, a method applied to predict climate change impacts and develop adaptive measures.[56] [57] [58] The advantage of such an approach is that connections between climate impacts are connected to other standard data trends such as GDP or population dynamics. 

The final challenge faced by the project was the need to avoid sectoral fragmentation. Through the roundtable meetings and briefing papers, coordinators continuously pressed upon stakeholders that climate change, as a complex and dynamic phenomenon, is inter-sectoral by nature and requires integrated short and long-term responses. This helped inter-sectoral thinking by stakeholders, allowing them to discover the necessity of inter-organisational cooperation and coordination.

Having highlighted the challenges faced by CAS and how these were overcome, understanding the lessons learned from the collaborative governance approach in Santiago de Chile is essential to help other organisations looking at a similar approach. What the roundtable participatory process sought to achieve was a vigorous and diverse approach to climate change adaptation for the MRS, which included experiences and concerns from a diverse range of individuals.[59] As for governance, Santiago generally incorporates low levels of public participation, “highly sectoral planning mechanisms, and short interaction between the private, public and academic spheres.” [60] Therefore, given climate change adaptations' complex nature, a collaborative process is needed to generate a series of cross-sectional measures with diverse inputs and scientific backing. As this is the first of its kind in Santiago, it achieved more participation than prior governmental approaches (e.g., 2006 climate change strategy). However, while coordinators achieved their aim of collaborative governance, many participants left feeling as though their voices were not heard.

The lessons learned from Santiago may be of considerable use to other actors involved in similar exercises in urban and regional settings. Bringing various sectors, levels of administration, and society together in a collaborative governance method is an essential step “in moving beyond sectoral approaches to problem-solving and climate change adaptation.”[61] Therefore, a successful participatory process for climate change needs to be precise and methodical in its approach to translating data to participants who are not knowledgeable on climate adaptation measures. The process must have adequate time to create the scientific consensus on climate change to understand the various opinions of participants. Consideration must also be given to the high costs of conducting such a process and conveying the importance of collaboration to maintain consistency and interest from stakeholders over the lengthy period it takes to carry out such a project. Future strategies should also consider participants' contributions at the implementation stage of policy or involve participants. Many participants were left frustrated at the little impact their voice had on the process. Having seen the success of roundtable meetings in similar cases on Participedia, further climate adaptation roundtables should listen to the lessons of CAS and build upon them.[62]

On a concluding note, despite the challenges and limitations of such a project, Santiago's climate change adaptation plan was generally successful.[63] Several projects of a similar basis have been carried out in Chile since CAS, and the discourse on climate change is coming increasingly into fruition (e.g. Chile's Nationally Determined Contribution process). Therefore, as CAS was the first of its kind, it can be assumed that it significantly impacted social capital building, and other cases could expand on its successes and limitations in order to create an increasingly democratic participatory process.[64]

See Also

Roundtable Discussion

References

[1] Universidad de Chile., 2006. Estudio de la vulnerabilidad climática para Chile en el siglo XXI [Study of the climatic vulnerability of Chile in the twenty-first century], Santiago. p.6

[2] Barton, J.R., 2013. Climate Change Adaptive Capacity in Santiago de Chile: Creating a Governance Regime for Sustainability Planning. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(6), pp.1916–1933. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1468- 2427.12033 [Accessed January 7, 2015]. p.1918. 

[3] Gallagher, D., n.d. Urban Climate Adaptation Planning in the Latin American Megacity: Lessons from Santiago, Chile. Available at https://planning-org... p.2. 

[4] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.2.

[5] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. Collaborative governance and the challenges of participatory climate change adaptation planning in Santiago de Chile. Climate and Development, 7(2), p.175.

[6] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.2

[7] The World Bank., 2021. The World Bank Chile. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chile/overview [Accessed on: 23/05/21]

[8] Krellenberg, K., and Hansjürgens, B. (Eds.)., 2014. Climate Adaptation Santiago. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. P.63

[9] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.176

[10] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.176.

[11] Ansell, C., & Gash, A., 2007. Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 546. https://academic.oup.com/jpart/article/18/4/543/1090370?login=true

[12] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015.  op. cit., p.175.

[13] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.5.

[14] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.6.

[15] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.6

[16] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.178.

[17] Ibid., p.178

[18] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.6.

[19] Ibid., p.6.

[20] Ibid., p.6.

[21] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.179.

[22] Ibid., p.179. 

[23] Krellenberg, K., and Hansjürgens, B., 2014. op.cit. p.163.

[24] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.180.

[25] Parry, L.J., 2016. When is a democratic innovation not a democratic innovation? The populist challenge in Australia. The Policy Space [blog]. Available at: http://www.thepolicyspace.com.au/2016/11/148-when-is-a-democratic-innovation-not-a-democratic-innovation-the-populist-challenge-in-australia [BROKEN LINK] Update: can be found at https://ncdd.org/22917

[26] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.179.

[27] Ibid., p.197-180.

[28] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.9

[29] Ibid., p.9.

[30] Ibid., p.10.

[31] Ibid., p.10.

[32] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015.  op. cit., p.181.

[33] Krellenberg, K., and Hansjürgens, B., 2014. op.cit., p.170.

[34] Smith, G., 2009. Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (Theories of Institutional Design). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.20.

[35] Ibid., p.20.

[36] Phillips, A., 1995. The politics of presence. Clarendon Press. p.5.

[37] Gallagher, D., n.d. op. cit., p.6.

[38] Ibid., p.4. 

[39] Ibid., p.8.

[40] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015.  op. cit., p.179.

[41] Few, R., Brown, K., & Tompkins, E. L., 2007. Public participation and climate change adaptation: avoiding the illusion of inclusion. Climate Policy, 7(1). P.47. http://www.asocam.org/sites/default/files/publicaciones/files/07308a8b9018adf191f294398246bb23.pdf 

[42] Krellenberg, K., and Hansjürgens, B., 2014. op.cit., p.163.

[43] Ibid., p.160. 

[44] Smith, G., 2009. op. cit., p.26.

[45] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015.  op. cit., p.181.

[46] Ibid., p.182.

[47] Smith, G., 2009. op. cit., p.20.

[48] Ibid., p.20.

[49] Ruth, Puddefoot, 2021, “Impact evaluation of participatory climate adaptation planning in Santiago de Chile”, essay submitted as final assessment in the 2021 Collective Intelligence Class at Southampton University.

[50] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015.  op. cit., p.180.

[51] Barton, J.R., 2009. Adaptación al cambio climático en la planificación de ciudades-regiones. Revista de Geografía Norte Grande, (43), pp.5-30. https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-34022009000200001

[52] Barton, J.R., 2013. op. cit., p.180. 

[53] Almansi, H., & Hardoy, J., 2013, May 31–June 2. Advancing on local urban climate change agendas through multi – stakeholder collaboration. Paper presented at 4th Global Forum on Urban Resilience and Adaptation. Session D3: Planning for resilient cities in Latin America and Asia. Bonn, Germany. p.8.

[54] Anguelovsky, I., & Carmin, J., 2011. Something borrowed, everything new: Innovation and institutionalization in urban climate governance. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 3., p.171.

[55] Krellenberg, K., & Barth, K. (in press). Inter- and transdisciplinary research for planning climate change adaptation responses – the example of Santiago de Chile. Interdisciplinary Science Review, Special issue: Transdisciplinary Environmental Science in Problem-oriented Strategic Research Programs, 39(4)., p.372.

[56] Berkhout, F., Hertin, J., & Jordan, A., 2002. Socio-economic futures in climate change impact assessment: Using scenarios as ‘learning machines.” Global Environmental Change, 12 (2)., p.83. 

[57] Centre for Research in Futures and Innovation (CRIF)., 2010. Scenario Workshop Guide. Univeristy of Glamorgan: IMCORE., p.28.

[58] Kopfmüller, J., 2014. Scenarios for future developments. In K. Krellenberg & B. Hansjürgens (Eds.), Climate adaptation Santiago. Heidelberg: Springer. p. 43–56.

[59] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.181. 

[60] Barton, J.R., 2009. op. cit., p.181.

[61] Barton, J.R., Krellenberg, K. and Harris, J.M., 2015. op. cit., p.182.

[62] Participedia., 2019. San Francisco Urban Rural Roundtable. [online] Participedia. Available at: https://participedia.net/case/70 [Accessed 25/05/21]

[63] Ibid., p.182.

[64] Ruth, Puddefoot, 2021, “Impact evaluation of participatory climate adaptation planning in Santiago de Chile”, essay submitted as final assessment in the 2021 Collective Intelligence Class at Southampton University.

External Links

More details on case: https://www.ufz.de/climate-adaptation-santiago/

Notes

Main image from: https://www.ufz.de/climate-adaptation-santiago/

Main analysis: Ruth, Puddefoot, 2021, “Impact evaluation of participatory climate adaptation planning in Santiago de Chile”, essay submitted as final assessment in the 2021 Collective Intelligence Class at Southampton University. Influenced by Barton, J.R., 2013. Climate Change Adaptive Capacity in Santiago de Chile: Creating a Governance Regime for Sustainability Planning. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(6), pp.1916–1933. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1468- 2427.12033 [Accessed January 7, 2015].