Problems and Purpose

The Chilean economy heavily depends on the exploitation of natural resources, which make up 75% of its total exports.[1] Consequently, this extractive industry needs to consume more energy to attract more investments and grow further. In turn, Chile’s energy sector mostly hinges on imports, such as oil, gas, and coal. Additionally, the unstable governments and economies of its neighbouring countries, Bolivia and Argentina, add yet another layer to Chile’s energy importation dependency problem, as it hinders the country’s economic growth policies. To illustrate, Chile had the highest electricity price hike in 2008 due to Argentina’s decision to cut back natural gas exports to Chile.[2] It was these risks and economic growth plans that encouraged Chilean governments to seek ways of improving the energy security of the country by diversifying the energy matrix in the early 2000s. In 2010, Chile voluntarily committed itself to mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and increasing the production of clean energy.[3] The country indeed opened the doors to the construction of renewable and clean energy projects in the early 2000s and 2010s. For example, the HydroAysén (HidroAysén) — a multi- billion hydroelectricity megaproject in a water-rich southern region of the country, Barrancones — a multi-million thermoelectricity megaproject in the north of Chile, or another multi-billion thermoelectricity megaproject Castilla planned to be executed in Totoral, again in the north. All these projects have at least one common feature—they failed because of the dissent and protests of the affected communities and nationwide demonstrations. The environmentalist groups mobilising people in these protests, such as the ecologist and indigenist group Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia (The Patagonia’s Defence Council), voiced concerns over the exclusion of the affected communities from participation in the formal decision-making processes.[4] These protests and their political impacts will be laid out in more detail in the “Background History and Context” section. However, it should be noted that the HydroAysén project—which would be

Chile’s costliest energy megaproject and investment, from inception to complete cancellation in 2017, underwent over a decade of discussions, approvals, public objections, legal proceedings, ministerial cancellation, and ultimately, cancellation by its private stakeholders.

In 2018, Chile’s then newly elected President Sebastián Piñera took office having already prepared an energy laws and policies package. The Energy Route 2018–2022: Leading the Modernization with Citizen Seal (in Spanish: “Ruta Energética 2018-2022: Liderando la modernización con sello ciudadano”) project was put forward by Piñera’s government as part of his government’s energy program. As announced by the government, the project aimed at improving the government’s energy program with inputs from different groups of society through a direct participatory process. Also, they declared that these inputs would be considered in prospective energy laws and policies. To learn about the citizens’ energy-related needs and concerns, the Ministry of Energy intended to bring a diverse array of citizens together in all the regions of Chile (15 regions back in 2018, but one more region was created later in 2018). Susana Jiménez Schuster, the Minister of Energy at the time, stated that the development of the Energy Route 2018-2022 aimed to encourage extensive participation and citizen dialogue, facilitating the inclusion of diverse voices from various sectors of society, including the private sector, public sector, and civil society.[5] Former Minister Jiménez remarked that “this work originates from the citizenry and for the citizenry” and “the role of the State is related to establishing policies, norms, and regulations, accompanying this modernising process of the energy sector...”[6] Thus, this project started with the promise of the government to review, analyse, and adapt the final recommendations from the workshops to modify the energy laws and modernise the sector.

The initiative sought to create a participatory process in all the regions of the country in order to “elaborate energy promises in a collective manner and establish the challenges of the sector.”[7]

Background History and Context

Chilean governments recognised the necessity of modernising the energy sector in the early 2000s. With factors such as the drought that afflicted Chile in the late 1990s, severely compromising hydroelectricity generation, Argentina’s 2001 political crisis which imposed restrictions on national gas exports in subsequent years, and the expanding mining industry that demanded increased energy supplies,[8] prompted successive Chilean governments to seek methods for reducing dependence on fossil fuel imports and diversifying energy sources. To keep the same rhythm of economic growth, Chile needed to duplicate its energy production.[9] During Michelle Bachelet’s first presidential term (2006-2010), there was a growing emphasis on energy diversification, modernisation, accessibility, and the development of renewable energy projects. Over the course of those years, particularly in the initial years of President Sebastián Piñera’s first term, several hydroelectric and thermoelectric megaprojects were in development. On the other hand, throughout Piñera’s first presidency, the country started witnessing fierce resistance against these megaprojects from affected communities, environmentalists, and indigenous groups.[10] In 2009 and 2010, affected communities and environmentalists in several cities of the country, including Santiago, protested multiple times against the thermoelectric station megaproject Barrancones. It was a multimillion megaproject financed by Belgian investors, which would negatively impact water and the ecosystem in the Humboldt Archipelago according to the residents of Coquimbo region and environmentalists.[11] After the protests, President Piñera suspended this project.[12] Another similar case happened in a remote area, Totoral, in the north of the country in 2012. This multi-billion thermoelectricity megaproject, which would be the largest thermoelectricity station in South America if built, was financed by a Brazilian investor. After the protests of the affected community and environmentalists, and lawsuits, this megaproject was overruled by the Supreme Court.[13]

The third case was the most controversial megaproject of all, which took over a decade from proposal to total cancellation. It was a multi-billion megaproject aiming to build five hydroelectricity power plants on two rivers of the Aysén region in Chilean Patagonia.[14] The HydroAysén (HidroAysén) was estimated to supply 30% of the annual energy consumption of Chile, transmitting electricity thousands of kilometres from south to central and northern Chile.[15] After the Environmental Evaluation Commission of Aysén approved the project on May 9, 2011, tens of thousands took to the streets in the main cities of Chile to protest its implementation, citing multiple irregularities in the proposal presented to the commission by the investor companies Endesa (a Spanish electricity company) and Colbún (a Chilean energy company). According to the environmentalist group Consejo de Defensa de la Patagonia (The Patagonia’s Defense Council), the implementation of this megaproject would impact the forests and wetlands, submerge rivers, undermine the endangered species of the region, and the transmission of electricity from the south to central and northern Chile would impact the Huilliche and Mapuche indigenous communities along the route.[16] Weeks-long protests and lawsuits put this megaproject on hold for several years until the Committee of Ministers of the government of Michelle Bachelet overturned it in 2014.[17] Despite continued efforts for a few more years, the investor companies ultimately ratified the cancellation of the project in late 2017.[18]

Chilean governments usually faced resistance from local, indigenous, and marginalised communities when it came to greenlighting large-scale energy projects—involving both traditional and clean technology.[19] In the second presidential term of Michelle Bachelet (2014- 2018), the government shifted its focus toward participatory schemes. Before enacting the long- term energy strategy Energía2050 (E2050) in 2015, Bachelet’s administration conducted numerous participatory workshops to understand the preferences and concerns of citizens.[20] This sudden interest in involving the citizenry in policymaking processes was in line with the demands of the public in general, and particularly with those of the affected communities, environmentalists, and indigenous groups. It sought “widening the bases of State legitimacy.”[21] Ureta (2017) argued that “participation” has taken on an almost magical quality, offering a means for energy policies to overcome several current limitations. Additionally, it provides a platform for the voices of citizens to be heard, ease tensions, and uplift policy effectiveness by including lay knowledge.[22] According to Urquiza et al. (2018), the Chilean government’s utilisation of participation is defined “as a form of enhancing the governability of the energy transition.”[23]

Following the Bachelet government’s participatory track and Energía2050 program, Piñera also continued promoting public and private sectors’ participation in energy policies throughout his second presidential term. In 2018, the government of Piñera proposed a “participatory and decentralising” public deliberations project—Energy Route 2018-2022: Leading the Modernization with Citizen Seal—with the purpose of modernising the energy infrastructure of Chile, focusing principally on two key issues: universal access to energy services and decarbonisation of energy matrix. This public deliberation project was organised and carried out by the Ministry of Energy and its regional ministerial secretariats (SEREMI) in the capital cities of the 15 regions of Chile from April 6 to 26, 2018.[24] The representatives of the Ministry of Energy and other policymakers from public institutions stated at different times that both Bachelet era participatory projects and the Energy Route 2018-2022 participatory workshops were used to socially validate the government’s already outlined energy policies.[25] From Bórquez González’s (2020) interview with an unnamed/coded policymaker of a governmental agency: “In the workshops, the course of actions that had been raised before was validated.”[26]

Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities

The participatory process of the Energy Route 2018-2022: Leading the Modernization with Citizen Seal was organised and financially supported by the Government of Chile during former President Sebastián Piñera’s second presidential term. Initiated by the Ministry of Energy, the process was conducted under the direct supervision of the ministry and its regional secretariats (SEREMI).[27]

No information could be found about the precise or estimated budget of this project. The budget report of the Ministry of Energy for the year 2018 does not illustrate explicitly the allocated funds for this project. Based on the data shown in the budget report of April 2018, the Ministry’s expenses were around USD 68,000,000 for that month. It is likely that the expenditures related to this project are distributed among various categories within the report.[28]

Participant Recruitment and Selection

During April 2018, the Ministry of Energy invited citizens from various segments of society, including community members, representatives of indigenous communities, businesses, academia, social and environmental organisations, and regional and local authorities, to participate in public deliberations concerning the government’s upcoming four-year energy policy. To this end, they held one-day workshops in 15 regions of the country and brought together a total of 2214 citizens in April 2018 (highest number of participants: Metropolitan Region of Santiago—268; lowest number of participants: Aysén—74).[29] The invitation announcements were posted on the Ministry’s website, on the Ministry’s and its regional secretariats’ social media accounts such as Twitter and Facebook, and in multiple news media outlets. The government did not employ a random selection method for participants; instead, it announced a self-selection process for any interested individuals from the public sphere, civil society, and stakeholders representing the private sector to register via email or phone for their local participatory workshop.[30] Although self-selection is a commonly used method in public participation initiatives and it usually seems appealing for its complete openness, it does not bring together a representative group of the larger public. Also, self-selected participants are generally from society’s wealthier and better-educated segments, who tend to have a formed opinion or stronger views before deliberations.[31]

As reported by the Ministry of Energy, the breakdown of the composition of the people who showed up in the workshops was as follows: 33% public; 32% NGOs, environmental actors, neighbourhood associations, foundations, and indigenous community members; 25% businesses and trade unions; 10% academia—professors, teachers, researchers, and students.[32] It is important to highlight that the 33% categorised as ‘public’ primarily consisted of representatives from state agencies, municipalities, and other public services, rather than the lay public.[33]

No information about the distribution of gender, representation of indigenous community members, age groups, and other demographic categories could be found.

Methods and Tools Used

The Ministry of Energy along with its regional secretariats organised one workshop in the capital cities of each region. The participants took part in roundtable discussions only in the first half of the day. In each workshop, the Ministry offered five thematic dialogue tables to the participants, each of which focused on different priority topics predetermined by the government. These topics included the modernisation of the energy sector, education and energy culture, security and quality of energy supply, and so on. The participants were free to choose any thematic working group/table that interested them, sit with other participants at that table, and express their opinions or requirements regarding three or four topics. Each discussion table had a moderator to facilitate discussions. At the end, each group had to decide on five priorities for the energy sector modernisation through a consensus, and present two of them in front of all participants.[34]

The ministry organised one workshop in each of the 15 regions. The workshops were held in person, in the capital cities of each region on weekdays, from April 6 to 26, 2018.

While no information about what kind of learning or discussion materials were given to the participants could be found, the pictures and videos from the workshops prove that the participants had some handouts during the discussions.

What Went On: Process, Interaction, and Participation

The whole process took less than a month. The Ministry of Energy invited citizens to register and participate in single-day workshops to share their concerns, opinions, preferences, and priorities related to the government’s future energy policies. In the workshops, the participants could choose a thematic working group (table) independently and discuss their views, concerns, and preferences with their fellow participants. The discussion groups included public sector representatives, private stakeholders, environmentalist NGOs, and other civil society members. Although the final report of the participatory workshops of the Energy Route 2018-2022 does not detail the interactions among the participants or the participants and organisers, it does mention that the moderators at each table were responsible for ensuring respectful dialogue among the participants.[35] Despite the high attendance numbers in the workshops, the “participatory process was short[er] and mainly consultative.”[36]

No information could be found about whether the workshops were open to only registered participants or random drop-ins were allowed.

Influence, Outcomes, and Effects

The workshop participants in all the regions of the country were instructed to decide on five priorities for each table and prepare a list of recommendations. The participants provided a total of 60 recommendations on nine topics in 15 regions. As reported, the Ministry of Energy analysed the workshop themes and recommendations, and by incorporating the government’s program along with the recommendations of the citizens, the Ministry designed a policy with seven directions to modernise the energy sector, which they named as ‘seven axes of the energy route.’ Additionally, the government formulated a list of 10 mega-promises in the energy sector.[37] Two published reports outlining the outcomes and effects of the participatory workshops and the Energy Route 2018-2022 policy, state that considering the recommendations of the public and the government’s 10 mega-promises after these public deliberations, the government implemented over 11 amendments to laws and more than nine statutory modifications.[38] Furthermore, the final report of the National Energy Policy of Piñera’s government—a part of Energía2050 long-term energy strategy—featured multiple changes as the outcome of the Energy Route 2018-2022 policy, which is said to include citizens’ inputs as well, such as re-training of more than 10,000 employees in the energy industry, introduction of energy education in dozens of educational establishments, and for educating the lay public on energy efficiency, climate change, energy in Chile, etc, the ministry developed a mobile phone application called “Energy Quiz.”[39]

Analysis and Lessons Learned

In his book “Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation,” Smith (2009) discusses how “deliberation prior to direct decision-making creates a more legitimate democratic process where citizens are encouraged to reflect on their preferences before making political choices.”[40] Although the participatory workshops the Energy Route 2018-2022: Leading the Modernization with Citizen Seal were organised to enhance the legitimacy of policymaking processes and validate already drafted energy policies with the participation of different actors in Chilean society, as the chosen participant selection method was self-selection, the workshops could not assemble an inclusive, descriptive representation of the population. The workshops might have primarily attracted interested people (goal-oriented motivated reasoners, Warren & Gastil, 2015) and once more exposed the existing inequalities in the society.[41] Despite the workshops drawing high attendance and generating significant interest among participants, who managed to identify several priorities and compile a list of recommendations in just one day, it’s crucial to note that these participative workshops were not designed to address factors such as gender distribution, diverse age groups, individuals from various socioeconomic backgrounds, or a representative number of indigenous communities. Additionally, the workshops were exclusively convened in the capital cities of each region on weekdays, rendering them inaccessible to individuals residing in smaller towns, rural areas, those without private transportation, or simply, employed people.

While the energy sector is often perceived as being heavily limited to expert decisions,[42] participants in the workshops from some regions emphasised the significance of early public participation in fostering better agreements between communities and energy projects.[43] Sara Larraín, a Chilean politician, ecologist, and the director of the environmentalist NGO “Chile Sustentable” (Sustainable Chile), who was once among the detained protesters of the 2011 HydroAysén demonstrations, commented positively on Piñera government’s attempt to consider citizens’ concerns and requirements in energy policies. She wrote in 2018, “We will see whether the will of the government to connect the public policy with the interests and demands of citizens will be expressed in the Energy Route 2018-2022.”[44] Despite the problems in the design of the participatory workshops of the Energy Route 2018-2022, the absence of negative opinions about these workshops in the news media and social media shows that, to a certain extent, the government managed to obtain some buy-in from the more concerned segments of the society through this participatory turn.

See Also

References

1. Claudio A. Agostini, Carlos Silva, and Shahriyar Nasirov, “Failure of Energy Mega-Projects in Chile: A Critical Review from Sustainability Perspectives,” Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland) 9, no. 6, (2017): 2, https://doi.org /10.3390/su9061073.

2. Yeliz Simsek et al., “Review and assessment of energy policy developments in Chile,” Energy Policy 127, (2019): 90, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.11.058.

3. Simsek et al., “Review and assessment of energy policy,” 87.

4. Soledad Pino, “Chile protesta por la construcción de cinco presas en la Patagonia,” Público, May 2, 2011, https://www.publico.es/ciencias/chile-protesta-construccion-cinco-presas.html.

5. Pino, “Chile protesta.”

6. Ministerio de Energía, Ruta Energética 2018-2022. Liderando la Modernización con Sello Ciudadano, (Ministerio de Energía, 2018), https://www.cne.cl/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/rutaenergetica2018-2022.pdf.

7. “Ministerio de Energía lanzó la Ruta Energética 2018-2022 con sello ciudadano,” Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, published April 14, 2018, https://msgg.gob.cl/wp/2018/04/14/ministerio-de-energia-lanzo-la-ruta- energetica-2018-2022-con-sello-ciudadano/.

8. Anahí Urquiza et al., “Participatory Energy Transitions as Boundary Objects: The Case of Chile’s Energía2050,” Frontiers in Energy Research 6, (2018): 2, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2018.00134.

9. Pino, “Chile protesta.”

10. Urquiza et al., “Participatory Energy Transitions.”

11. Aldo Anfossi, “Nuevo escándalo de Piñera en Chile: Ahora por los ‘Papeles Pandora,’” La Jornada, October 3, 2021, https://www.jornada.com.mx/notas/2021/10/03/mundo/pinera-contra-las-cuerdas-en-chile-ahora-por-los- papeles-pandora/.

12. Pino, “Chile protesta.”

13. “La Guerra Civil De Castilla,” La Tercera, September 9, 2012, https://www.latercera.com/diario-impreso/la- guerra-civil-de-castilla/.

14. Agostini, Silva and Nasirov, “Failure of Energy Mega-Projects.”

15. Pino, “Chile protesta.”

16. Ibid.

17. “Dura derrota de HidroAysén: “Rechazado” por Comité de Ministros,” La Nación, June 10, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20160628133829/http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/economia/energia/dura-derrota- de-hidroaysen-rechazado-por-comite-de-ministros/2014-06-10/111656.html.

18. “Enel y Colbún confirman el fin de Hidroaysén,” La Tercera, November 17, 2017, https://www.latercera.com/noticia/enel-colbun-confirman-fin-hidroaysen/.

19. See, Agostini, Silva and Nasirov, “Failure of Energy Mega-Projects”; Urquiza et al., “Participatory Energy Transitions.”; Maximiliano Proaño, “Is an energy revolution underway in Chile?” EnergyTransition.Org, July 9, 2018, https://energytransition.org/2018/07/is-an-energy-revolution-underway-in-chile/; Sebastián Ureta, “A very public mess: Problematizing the “participative turn” in energy policy in Chile,” Energy Research & Social Science 29, (2017): 127, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.04.009.

20. Ureta, “A very public mess.”

21. Urquiza et al., “Participatory Energy Transitions.”

22. Ureta, “A very public mess.”

23. Urquiza et al., “Participatory Energy Transitions.”

24. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

25. See, Ureta, “A very public mess”; Roxana Elizabeth Bórquez González, “Energy policies in Chile: The deliberative turn in a post-dictatorship democracy,” (PhD diss., King’s College London, 2020), https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/159878717/2021_Borquez_Gonzalez_Roxana_Elizabeth_1456922_ethesis.pdf 26 Bórquez González, “Energy policies in Chile,” 207.

27. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

28. “2018—Ministerio de Energía,” DIPRES Documentación, retrieved March 31, 2024, from https://www.dipres.gob.cl/597/w3-multipropertyvalues-20674-24043.html#ejecucion.

29. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

30. “Invitan a participar de taller para elaborar la Ruta Energética 2018-2022,” Ministerio de Energía, published April 9, 2018, https://energia.gob.cl/noticias/los-rios/invitan-participar-de-taller-para-elaborar-la-ruta-energetica-2018- 2022.

31. Archon Fung, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance,” Public Administration Review 66 (s1), (2006): 66-75, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00667.x.

32. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

33. “Ruta Energética cierra su etapa de talleres ciudadanos con encuentro en Estación Mapocho,” Ministerio de Energía, April 26, 2018, https://energia.gob.cl/noticias/metropolitana-de-santiago/ruta-energetica-cierra-su-etapa- de-talleres-ciudadanos-con-encuentro-en-estacion-mapocho.

34. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

35. Ibid.

36. Bórquez González, “Energy policies in Chile,” 207.

37. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

38. See, Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022”; Ministerio de Energía, “Informe Cuenta Pública Participativa Nacional Años 2018 – 2022,” (Ministerio de Energía, 2022), https://energia.gob.cl/sites/default/files/documentos/borrador_cuenta_publica_2018_-2022cc.pdf.

39. Ministerio de Energía, “Informe Cuenta Pública.”

40. Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11.

41. See, Smith, “Democratic Innovations”; Mark E. Warren and John Gastil, “Can Deliberative Minipublics Address the Cognitive Challenges of Democratic Citizenship?” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 2, (2015): 562–574. https://doi.org/10.1086/680078.

42. Agostini, Silva and Nasirov, “Failure of Energy Mega-Projects.”

43. Ministerio de Energía, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022.”

44. Sara Larraín, “Ruta Energética 2018-2022, conectando las agendas de energía y climática,” Cooperativa.cl, May 9, 2018, https://opinion.cooperativa.cl/opinion/medio-ambiente/ruta-energetica-2018-2022-conectando-las- agendas-de-energia-y-climatica/2018-05-09/064727.html,

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Notes