Problems and Purpose

In response to negative reception after newly-inaugurated South Korean president Moon Jae-in ceased production on two nuclear reactions, Shin-Kori 5 and 6, Moon announced that he would pursue public consensus on the matter. A stratified random sample of 471 South Korean citizens were educated on the merits and drawbacks of continuing construction on two nuclear reactors, Shin-Kori 5 and 6. They met from October 13-15 to decide upon a course of action to recommend to president Moon Jae-in. 

Background History and Context

South Korea, on account of its lack of natural resources, has long been an importer of energy. Seeking self-sufficiency, it was one of the first countries to participate in the “Atoms for Peace” initiative, which resulted in its first nuclear reactor being built by the United States in 1962. South Korea built Kori 1, its first self-made reactor, in 1978. Through the 1990s, South Korea focused heavily on nuclear power, creating seven more nuclear reactors as its presidential administrations continued to endorse the new energy source.  Through the 2000s and 2010s, Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye likewise embraced nuclear energy, but when each of their administrations ended in ignominious corruption scandals, an ever-larger portion of the nation sought a thorough shift away from the paradigm of old. [1] This was the continuation of a decades-long shift away from an idealized perception of nuclear power: the Korean nuclear industry was nurtured by a government that, though fully democratized, has historically been held under the thumb of bureaucrats and military personnel, resulting in a legislative body that systematically subdued dissenting voices. As a result, anti-nuclear sentiment had been left to fester, only starting to bubble up in the 1990s in the form of not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) movements, and more importantly, in the wake of nearly 200 accidents at local reactors. [2]

Thus, it was clear that the shift to nuclear power was not without drawbacks, and safety issues were at the top of the list of concerns. The 2011 disaster in Japan at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant had placed East Asian nations on high alert towards the potential dangers of nuclear production. In 2015, South Korea very nearly avoided a nuclear disaster of its own when an earthquake struck Gyeongju, a city that hosts a repository for the disposal of nuclear waste and which is located near Ulsan and Busan, sites with their own nuclear reactors. [3] By the time Moon Jae-in replaced the impeached Park Geun-hye in 2017, the public had long since grown wary of the continued employment of nuclear power in Korea; a study from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology revealed an increased public bias towards renewable energy techniques as substitutes for nuclear power in the years following the disasters at Fukushima and in Korea. [4] As he took office, Moon swore to make South Korea a nuclear-free country. He shut down Kori 1 to positive reception, but his next decision was met with public outcry: he ceased production on Shin-Kori 5 and 6, two in-production reactors in Busan. Critics primarily cited sunk costs – production was 28.8% complete and had already cost South Korea $1.4 billion – but also pointed to adverse consequences for plant-builders and local citizens, who had expected jobs and financial benefits from the project. [5] In response to the negative reception, Moon announced that he would pursue public consensus on the matter; at his 28th cabinet meeting on July 27, 2017, a task force was created to construct a deliberative opinion poll to measure this consensus. [6]

Organizing, Supporting, and Funding Entities

The deliberative opinion poll was organized and funded by the Moon administration. In particular, the cabinet established a task force within the Korean Office for Government Policy Coordination, commissioned with designing, implementing, and drawing conclusions from a proper deliberative process. Nine committee members were selected from seventeen candidates; candidates were nominated by academic institutions specialized in the following areas: humanities and social sciences, science and technology, research and statistics, and conflict management. [7]

Participant Recruitment and Selection

Participants were selected from registered Korean citizens. These citizens were stratified by three categories: region (from 16 metropolitan cities and provinces), gender, and age group, totalling 160 distinct strata. The committee then created an initial sample pool of 20,000 via stratified random sampling. To narrow the selection further, the committee surveyed these 20,000 respondents and stratified them by gender and age group, and then by attitudes on the continuation of Shin-Kori construction (pro-, anti-, or impartial/judgement reserved). Randomly sampling from the 5,981 who expressed interest in contributing to the deliberations resulted in a final sample of 500 individuals chosen to participate. [8]

Methods and Tools Used

This event used the deliberative opinion poll model created by James Fishkin. This model, well suited to the highly technical field of nuclear energy, sees a representative sample educated on the information necessary to engage in dialogue and to make a rational decision on a given matter. Various tools of engagement, including written materials, lectures, Q&A sessions, and surveys, are used to provide this information, culminating in small group discussions. [9]

What Went On: Process, Interaction, and Participation

Upon the selection of the 500-person sample, a critical deliberation period took place over 33 days, from September 13, 2017 until October 15, 2017. This deliberation period included the following resources for participants, each to be discussed in detail below:

• Written materials prepared by the committee, proponents, and opponents of resumption
• An asynchronous e-lecture curriculum consisting of 11 lectures released between September 21, 2017 and October 7, 2017
• Live and non-live question/answer sessions held continuously during the period
• A general forum, to offer face-to-face time for participants to establish rational opinions in a final deliberation process lasting from October 13-15, 2017.

Of 500 people invited, 478 attended the program orientation on September 16, 2017. 471 would eventually vote as part of the described process. On September 28, 2017, participants were mailed a 70-page sourcebook containing four chapters. The first listed the details of the deliberative opinion poll to ensure complete transparency was being offered to the participants; the second explained the science behind nuclear power and Korea’s history with the alternative energy source. Both were authored by the committee. The third and fourth chapters, written by major stakeholders on each side, presented the arguments for and against the continuation of construction on Shin-Kori 5 and 6. To ensure fairness, chapters 3 and 4 were printed in reverse order in a random half of the sourcebooks. A panel of nuclear energy experts was commissioned by the committee to confirm the validity of all numerical claims, but non-numerical arguments were not subject to any review. Participants were given 15 days to review the contents.

In tandem with the released sourcebooks, video lectures were also provided to allow for a more comprehensive learning experience for the participants. 11 were released in total: one reiterating the deliberative process, and one from each side of the debate addressing 5 categories: the safety of nuclear power, the effect of nuclear energy on electricity supply, its effect on national industry, the outlook for Korean energy policy, and final opinions. Overall, the participation rate for the online lectures was 92%. In addition to the lectures, experts on both sides were frequently available between September 16 and October 13 to answer questions regarding the content. Supplementary sessions were provided for those who had trouble with the material. [10]

Having been provided extensive materials for review, the 471 final participants convened at Kye Seong Won in Cheonan, a medium-sized urban center in South Chungcheong province. From October 13-15, 2017, the participants partook in a general forum with four distinct discussion-oriented sections on the following topics: on general reasons for suspension or resumption; on issues related to safety and the environment; on economic implications; and on final deliberations and social acceptance. Each session was divided into three parts: presentations by the stakeholders of each side, discussion in small groups, and a reconvened Q&A session. The small group discussions occurred in groups of nine or ten for 60 minutes per session; moderators were to allow groups to be self-driven and to discuss matters autonomously. The Q&A sessions were not targeted towards individual questions, but towards any outstanding questions that came out of the small group deliberations. Each small group brought one question for each of the proponent and opponent stakeholders, who were permitted two minutes to answer, two minutes to rebut the answers of the other camp, and one minute to counter the prior rebuttal. After four such sessions, the forum reconvened for the final survey. [11]

Due to the government-sponsored nature of the process and its direct ties to notable campaign promises, a great deal of public scrutiny was to be expected of the deliberations. Consequently, the committee elected to organize a supplementary, public-facing deliberation program, a novelty in the area of deliberative polling. The committee programmed public citizens’ debates across different districts of Korea to encourage public awareness and participation on the issue and to receive feedback on the deliberative process itself. [12] Debates between academics were also broadcast on national television, ensuring that the public was receiving the same information and hearing the same arguments as the participants in Cheonan. [13] More detail regarding the committee’s communication with the public can be found in section 8: Analysis and Lessons Learned. 

Influence, Outcomes, and Effects

The extended opportunity for education and conversation provided by the deliberative opinion poll resulted in a nuanced outcome:

• 59.5% of 471 respondents supported resuming construction on Shin-Kori 5 and 6
• However, 53.2% of respondents advocated reducing the use of nuclear power in the long run, compared to just 35.5% who favored continued reliance on nuclear energy
• For the majority of participants, safety was the foremost concern and the top priority. On a scale from 1-7, ranging from least to most important, safety received an average score of 6.7. The next highest priorities were the stability of the energy supplied and the environmental impact, at 6.33 and 6.29, respectively. [14]

Although the decision reached by the committee was merely a policy recommendation and not a binding legislative decision, President Moon accepted the verdict, reversing his prior decision, and announced the resumption of construction on Shin-Kori 5 and 6 on October 22, 2017. In this announcement, he further acknowledged the committee’s recommendation by maintaining that the government would not allow for the construction of any new reactors. [15] True to his word, while Shin-Kori 5 and 6 remain under construction, no plans for any new projects have surfaced. Subsequent inquiries have shown that public rhetoric around nuclear power has changed dramatically since 2017. A 2018 study illustrated a spike in anti-nuclear sentiment following the Shin-kori decision, perhaps because it brought safety and environmental concerns with nuclear power to light, or perhaps simply as a response to the government’s position. [16]

Analysis and Lessons Learned

The entirety of the deliberative process saw extensive engagement from its participants. It must be noted that, by opting into consideration on the first survey, the 6,000 individuals from whom the 500 were selected were inclined towards participation. Still, the rigorous stratifying of the sampled population ensured that the participants were appropriately representative of the Korean population. [17] With 94% (471/500) of selected individuals opting to participate, and with more than 90% engaging with all of the provided course material (as far as could be measured), a vested interest from this representative sample was apparent. [18]

This engagement, a blessing for the democratic process, came with implications: due to the government-sponsored nature of the deliberations, such intense public interest came with the need to address the possibility of bias and the overall validity and impartiality of the process. In addition to the publication of the curriculum available to the participants, the committee took steps to invoke both fairness and transparency. Three of the four surveys - one to narrow the sample from 5,981 to 500, one administered at the start of the forum, and the final verdict - were constructed by purportedly impartial polling experts so as to avoid bias in the questions. [19] The public was briefed regularly on all meetings of the committee in advance of the forum, with meeting minutes released online for public viewing. All committee operations were overseen by the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research at Seoul National University, a third party academic institution with no party affiliation. [20]

Despite seemingly pulling out all the stops to create a maximally equitable deliberative process, the proceedings in Cheonan were not without issue from the perspective of the public or the participants. Pundits criticized the government for creating an environment that pressured the participants into voting no, pointing to the fact that construction had stopped before the deliberations began. [21] As for the deliberations themselves, some outside voices felt that materials were rushed through production and the timeline too accelerated for a decision of this magnitude. [22] For the participants, although the material was considered highly informative and the procedures generally well-organized, many complained of a shortage in the core principle of deliberative democracy: discussion. 60 minute sessions were thought to be too short for 9-10 different voices to be heard, and a good amount of that time was spent formulating the group’s singular question, distracting from the discussion itself. [23]

Nonetheless, as far as the overall utility of the deliberative opinion poll, its success in this case was multifold. [24] In their effort to transform nuclear energy from an expert-driven agenda to a civic one, the committee proved transparent about proceedings and thoughtful about randomization and removal of potential biases. A highly representative sample featured individuals across gender and generational gaps, and a thorough curriculum helped inform and develop citizen perspectives on a highly technical issue. Participants agreed in majority that the process had helped to “promote a democratic consciousness, civic participation, and awareness of the importance of public deliberation.” [25]

See Also

Deliberative Polling

References

1. Nguyen, Viet Phuong, “An Analysis of Moon Jae-in’s Nuclear Phase-Out Policy,” Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, December 3, 2018, https://issuu.com/georgetownsfs/docs/gjaa_vol.4_no.2/73?fbclid=IwAR07vH2yZtgtWcEsc7HM_pCpuJtirEc5_NY62kDOmfeyPQfSH6jm0wbRtbA
2. Valentine, S. and Sovacool, B., “The socio-political economy of nuclear power development in Japan and South Korea,” Elsevier, 2010, Vol. 38, 7971-7979, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227415252_The_socio-political_economy_of_nuclear_power_development_in_Japan_and_South_Korea
3. Jang, Se-young, “South Korea’s Nuclear Energy Debate,” The Diplomat, October 26, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/south-koreas-nuclear-energy-debate/
4. Park, Eun-il, “Factors influencing the public intention to use renewable energy technologies in South Korea: Effects of the Fukushima nuclear accident,” Elsevier, 2014, Volume 65, 198-211, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421513010598/pdfft?md5=37bd6fcc6e92d28a8ce2b486a30a79ab&pid=1-s2.0-S0301421513010598-main.pdf
5. Lim, Eun-jung, “South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2019, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1585585
6. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, October 20, 2017, 16, https://cdd.stanford.edu/2017/results-of-participatory-surveys-for-public-deliberation-on-shin-gori-nuclear-reactors-no-5-6/
7. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 17
8. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 59
9. “What is Deliberative Polling?” Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy, https://cdd.stanford.edu/what-is-deliberative-polling/, accessed 3/5/21
10. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 37-38
11. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 38-39
12. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 40-42
13. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 48-49
14. Kim, Gil-so, “A Case Study on Deliberative Polling for the Shin-Kori Nuclear Reactors,” Korean Journal for Local Government and Administration Studies, 2018, Volume 32, no. 2, 205-224, https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART002358847 (Korean)
15. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 91
16. “South Korean President Accepts Public Decision,” World Nuclear News, October 23, 2017, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-South-Korean-president-accepts-public-decision-2310175.html
17. Kim, Kyung-Shin, “Changes in Risk Perception of SNU Students in Nuclear Power under Opposing Government Policy,” Department of Environment and Energy Engineering at Sungshin Women’s University, July 6, 2018, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/7/2350
18. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 74
19. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 112
20. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 65
21. Kim, Gil-so, “A Case Study on Deliberative Polling for the Shin-Kori Nuclear Reactors,” KJLGAS, 212
22. “Precious Lessons,” The Korea Herald, October 22, 2017, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171022000055&ACE_SEARCH=1
23. Kim, Gil-so, “A Case Study on Deliberative Polling for the Shin-Kori Nuclear Reactors,” KJLGAS, 218
24. “South Korea’s Nuclear Energy Debate,” The Diplomat.
25. Kim, Gil-so, “A Case Study on Deliberative Polling for the Shin-Kori Nuclear Reactors,” KJLGAS, 218
26. “Results of Participatory Surveys for Public Deliberation on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6,” The Public Deliberation Committee on Shin-Gori Nuclear Reactors 5 and 6, 44

External Links

Notes

Data was sourced from OECD (2020), Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/339306da-en.